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THE SECURITY OF OUR SECRETS: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY





United States statistical programs and practices are among the best
in the world. Lurking underneath this success, however, is a riddle-
given the potential for abuse and harm, why do Americans willingly hand
over their personal information to government data collection pro-
grams? In this article, we seek an answer to this riddle by examining the
evolution of United States legal and statistical programs, with a particu-
lar focus on the United States Census of Population. In so doing, we
explore the statistical programs, policies, regulations, and codes of eth-
ics that have evolved in the United States over the past two centuries.
We conclude that the willingness of individuals to disclose their personal
information is not linked to programs of legal coercion or to simple
cost/benefit analyses. Instead, we note that the intent of United States
statistical programs has been to increase the level of trust and confi-
dence that individuals have that their information will be kept strictly
confidential. Various legal frameworks and the promulgation of statisti-
cal society codes of ethics buttress our basic conclusion that trust is an
essential characteristic of a successful and efficient modern statistical
program. We conclude by noting some recent developments that may
threaten this trust program, including post 9/11 national security efforts,
the rise of new data-gathering and analysis technologies, and the in-
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creasing use of private data collectors for government statistical pro-
grams.
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INTRODUCTION
Statistics and United States government statistical programs are
stereotypically viewed as somewhat dull, otherwise benign. In the
United States, data collected by federal statistical agencies are used for
myriad purposes: from estimating unemployment and crime, to determin-
ing effectiveness of educational programs, to mapping traffic patterns.
Every year, hundreds of thousands of households voluntarily provide
information to government surveys.
Yet government data collection has its darker side. It has been
claimed that data from censuses and population registers were used in the
United States' forced internment of Japanese-Americans in World War
11,1 in Nazi Germany's rounding-up and execution of millions during the
Holocaust, 2 and in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.3 These are extreme
1. William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, After Pearl Harbor: The Proper Role of Population
Data Systems in Time of War 4-22 (Mar. 28, 2000) (unpublished draft manuscript),
http://www.uwm.edu/-margo/govstat/newpaa.pdf.
2. William Seltzer, Population statistics, the Holocaust and the Nuremberg Trials, 24
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 511,515-517 (1998).
3. ALISON DES FORGES, NEW YORK: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE To TELL THE
STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
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examples, but even well-meaning uses of data can potentially harm indi-
viduals. Innocent mishandling, misfiling, or misinterpreting of data can
have real consequences for the unfortunate souls whose lives or liveli-
hood may depend on how their information is used. The damage from
improper handling of private information is not confined solely to pecu-
niary or bodily harm-many citizens are just as concerned that govern-
ment data collection and use violates their privacy preferences. As a
result, individuals may view even ordinary data collection requests or
uses as embarrassing or particularly intrusive. Such attitudes may reduce
the willingness of individuals to engage in voluntary information disclo-
sures both today and in the future.
Elsewhere, we have argued that the United States is experiencing a
"third wave" 4 of increased privacy concern. Linked to technological
innovations and the concerted efforts of various interests groups to raise
awareness and alarm,5 this third privacy wave has heightened concerns
about information sharing in general. The rise in privacy concerns has
not left government statistical programs unaffected. Events surrounding
the 2000 Census reveal that the government's tenuous ability to rely on
voluntary information disclosures is intimately linked to perceptions of
confidentiality and secrecy. During the 2000 Presidential election, the
United States Census became a subject of political controversy. Then-
Governor George W. Bush, when asked about the census, declared that
he could "understand why people don't want to give that information
over to the government .... I'm not sure I would either. ... If people are
worried about government intruding in their lives, they should think
about it."'6 Candidate Bush was joined by other politicians and various
radio talk show hosts in urging Americans to protect their privacy by
refusing to answer questions they felt were too intrusive.7
A large-scale revolt against government data collection efforts in
general, and the census in particular, could spell disaster for numerous
programs. Indeed, then-Director of the Census Bureau, Kenneth Prewitt,
was deeply concerned that "[t]he census was compromised by those who
raised issues about privacy., 8 The political furor did not adversely affect
Genol-3-02.htm#P22_7285 (describing how population registers were used to identify Tutsis).
4. See Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr, Counting on Confidentiality: Legal and Statisti-
cal Approaches to Federal Privacy Law After the USA PATRIOT ACT, 2005 WIsC. L. REV. (forth-
coming late 2005).
5. See Stephen A. Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create A Privacy Entitlement In Cyberspace,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877 (2001).
6. Terence Samuel, The Job of Counting the Next 100 Million People is a Lot Harder This
Year, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Apr. 23, 2000, at A14.
7. Id.
8. Bill Hillburg, Response Rate 65% For Census Return Of Mail-In Forms Matches 1990
Nationwide, DAILY NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, Apr. 20, 2000, at N3 (quoting Mr. Prewitt) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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overall response rates9 but raised the specter of a renewed backlash
against government data collection efforts. In short, the general view
that privacy needs to be protected is a potential source for individual
refusal to provide full and accurate information for future government
statistical projects.
Rising public concern over privacy and the dangers inherent in gov-
ernment uses of personal information collide with society's increasing
data requirements. The federal government provides a staggering array
of services that depend on submission of personal information for eligi-
bility and apportionment. National economic policy and forecasting are
equally affected by access to, and detailed analysis of, private informa-
tion. Government policies and services are so essential to the function-
ing of modem society that some now conclude that efficient government
based on access to data sets is a fundamental democratic right'l and is
essential to a well-functioning democracy. 1
9. Although the response rates for the 1990 and 2000 Censuses were essentially the same,
Prewitt did acknowledge at one point that "The long-form response rate is lagging behind the short
form by more than double the rate experienced in 1990." Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census
Director and Commerce Secretary Say Nation 'In Reach' of Major Civic Accomplishment (Apr. 11,
2000), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/census_2000/000581 .html. See
also Mike Johnson, Census Response Rate up in U.S. but Wisconsin gets Bumped to No. 2 as Rate
Drops from 77% to 75%, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 2000, at B1 (noting that "Prewitt said
that controversy affected the return rates for the long form.").
10. See Paul D. Reynolds, Privacy and Advances in Social and Policy Sciences: Balancing
Present Costs and Future Gains, 9 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 275, 310 (1993). According to Reynolds:
Citizens have a right to an efficient, effective, and just government. Given the current
complexity of major social problems, optimal government decisions are not possible
without more complete and detailed understanding of these social problems. This under-
standing will not be forthcoming without research access to large-scale data sets on indi-
viduals and organizations.
Id; See also New River Media Interview with Kenneth Prewitt, Director, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.pbs.org/finc/interviews/prewitt.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005) (quoting Kenneth
Prewitt, Director U.S. Census Bureau):
I would say that what I would call the nation's number system, good statistics, is critical
to democracy [and] effective governance: How in the world can you govern a compli-
cated industrial, advanced industrial economy or now our new knowledge economy with-
out decent information by those people who have to write the laws and administer the
laws and the programs?
Id.
As former Census Director Kenneth Prewitt has argued: "Information is two-way traffic in
a democracy. It is to help the government know what the people need, and it is to help the people
know if they are getting what they need, otherwise it is all anecdotes, and anecdotes are not good
enough as far as I'm concerned to run a serious democracy." Prewitt also argues that access to data
is essential to the basic workings and responsibilities of a democratic government. According to
Prewitt, "[tihe people who wrote the Constitution had in mind that this society could govern itself
better on the basis of quality information .... If we don't have information on reading scores, if we
don't have information on poverty rates, if we don't have information on health, if we don't
have information, broad-gauged information about what the government is doing, how in the world
do we punish them at election time?" Press Briefing, U.S. Census Bureau, Press Briefing -- April 19,
2000 Director Prewitt (Joined in Progress), http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/4-19.html.
11. According to Steven L. Katz:
Transparency is a fundamental issue for democracy and differentiates totalitarian and
democratic societies. When information is not disclosed to the public, government has
failed to exercise the best means of maintaining public trust and dispelling distrust.
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Despite all these misgivings and potential harms, Americans have,
for most of the past century, been willing participants in government data
collection requests. The United States Census, for example, has enjoyed
relatively high compliance rates 12 and other surveys and data projects
have had similar success. 3 The question is why have Americans been
willing to provide information for the past 100 years and will the current
wave of privacy concern affect this willingness?
In this article, we explore the history of government data collection
practices to seek an answer to this riddle. This historical exegesis is not
limited merely to government practices-we also examine the evolution
of statistical societies and, in particular, the varying approaches to statis-
tical practice and ethics they adopt. As we will demonstrate here, the
compliance rates that government surveys and data projects currently
enjoy are not the result of an endemic preference by Americans to reveal
their data to government census officials or data collectors. Instead, the
history of United States statistical practice reveals a progression of gov-
ernment programs seeking to increase the voluntariness and accuracy of
disclosed data by augmenting the trust that individuals have in the gov-
ernment's willingness and ability to use data solely for their intended
purpose.
When government actually is conducted in secret or access to relevant information is de-
nied, then public support for and confidence in the resultant laws and policies is com-
promised.
Steven L. Katz, Transparency in the U.S.: Towards Worldwide Access to Government, THE
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC INQUIRY, Fall/Winter 2001, at 55, 57. See also ALAN CHARLES RAUL,
PRIVACY AND THE DIGITAL STATE: BALANCING PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 22,
40 (2002) ("The first and likely most important benefit of open access to state records is that it facili-
tates representative government."); GEORGE T. DUNCAN, EXPLORING THE TENSION BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND THE SOCIAL BENEFIT OF GOVERNMENTAL DATABASES 7 (2004),
http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/archive/AccessGrid/documents/ExploringtheTension.pdf ("Broad
access to data supports democratic decision-making. Access to government statistical information
supports public policy formulation in areas ranging through demographics, crime, business regula-
tion and development, education, national defense, energy, environment, health, natural resources,
safety, and transportation.").
These widely shared ideals about the virtues of statistics for restraining authoritarian
tendencies within government resulted in a large number of statisticians decrying Attorney General
John Ashcroft's decision to "encourage[] federal agencies to reject requests for documents if there
was any legal basis to do so, promising that the Justice Department would defend them in court....
a stark reversal of the policy set eight years earlier... " Adam Clymer, Government Openness at
Issue as Bush Holds on to Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al.
12. The primary data collection for the 2000 Census was done by mailing out questionnaires
and requesting households to mail back the forms when completed. The final mail return rate, de-
fined to be the number of households returning the form by mail divided by the number of occupied
housing units in mailback areas, was 78% for the 2000 Census. For 1970, 1980, and 1990, the mail
return rates were 87%, 81%, and 75% respectively. HERBERT F. STACKHOUSE AND SARAH BRADY,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 MAIL RETURN RATES: FINAL REPORT 1, 13 (Census 2000
Evaluation A.7.b, 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/A.7.b.pdf.
13. Response rates are often higher for government surveys than for the Decennial Census.
For example, nonresponse rates for the U.S. National Crime Victimization Survey, the National
Health Interview Survey, and the Current Population Survey have all historically been below 10%.
ROBERT M. GROVES & MICK P. COUPER, NONRESPONSE IN HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SURVEYS 160-
61(1998).
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The history of government data collection practices reveals that, in
the earliest years of the country, efforts to enforce compliance through
legal coercion, 14 community policing and shaming, 5 and purely volun-
tary efforts 16 failed. In the face of a non-complying public, the federal
government began to adopt measures to ensure the strict confidentiality
of submitted data.' 7 As we show here, the concept of confidentiality,
although linked in part to an evolving sense of human dignity and enti-
tlement,1 8 was used mainly to encourage citizen compliance with data
collection requests.' 9 Indeed, the concept of confidentiality in law ap-
pears to have been little more than a tool for fostering trust between data
subjects and federal statistical agencies-a trust that submitted data
would only be used for the purposes for which it was originally submit-
ted.2°
Not surprisingly, statistical societies played an important role in fos-
tering respect for confidentiality. Voluntary codes of ethical conduct
stressed the utility of confidentiality in statistical practice, noting that it
increased compliance rates and promoted honest disclosure.2' By the
mid-twentieth century, government practice and statistical ethics enjoyed
a confluence of approaches-legally enforceable confidentiality pledges
coupled with statistical practices to protect individual identity-that re-
sulted in unprecedented compliance rates with disclosure requests. For
more than a century, the view that confidentiality protections enhance
response rates and accuracy has been largely correct and successful in
inducing compliance with data requests.
Throughout the twentieth century, the interplay of legally mandated
privacy and statistical methodology has created a system of statistical
programs that virtually assure individual confidentiality. The result, for
some, is to conclude that "[f]ederal statistics are not about individuals,
[and] therefore they are not about privacy., 22 Such assurances, although
widely correct, ignore recent developments in privacy attitudes that
threaten to undermine the perception and reality of data confidentiality.
As we discuss in more detail in another work, the concepts of confidenti-
ality and privacy are changing in the face of breathtaking new technolo-
gies and data analysis methods and may require reassessment in some
areas. 23 Just as important as these changes, however, are individuals'
14. See infra Part IA.
15. See infra Part IA.
16. See infra Part IA
17. See infra Part IA
18. See generally infra Part I.
19. See infra Part IA.
20. See infra Part 1B.
21. See infra Part LB.
22. Charles W. Holmes, Response To Long Census Form Below '90 Rate, PALM BEACH POST,
April 20, 2000, at 12A (quoting Prewitt).
23. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
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perceptions of the confidentiality of their data and whether promises of
non-disclosure given by the government over the past century remain
sacrosanct. To parallel a famous legal maxim, "it is not enough to assure
confidentiality, we must appear to assure individual confidentiality."
Recent government efforts to increase security in the years since the
events of September 11, 2001 ("9/11") undermine, at a minimum, this
appearance of confidentiality.24
Ultimately, security driven initiatives and actions, although perhaps
laudable for other reasons, may destroy the willingness of individuals to
consent to government data collection requests. Because the willingness
of individuals to provide full and accurate information is central to the
functioning and well-being of democratic government, a better under-
standing of the history of government statistical practice and the history
of statistical societies is, we believe, an important step for avoiding this
disastrous and potential future.
To these ends, the remainder of this article contains three parts.
Part I recounts the development and history of privacy in government
statistical practice. By focusing on legal and agency developments, we
reveal how high cost compliance regimes that sought to coerce citizen
compliance met with resistance and failure.
Part II reviews the rise of statistical societies and the changing na-
ture of their ethical codes of conduct. In this part, we analyze how such
societies, although deeply interested in the privacy and dignity of re-
spondents, quickly seized on confidentiality, and its trust promoting
qualities, as the key to increasing compliance and accuracy.
Part III builds on this historical exegesis, and compares and con-
trasts the privacy approaches of each discipline. Of particular interest is
the contrast between the state's understandable decision to define privacy
in terms of baseline individual rights, and statisticians' view that privacy
is a factor to be considered in a more robust cost-benefit analysis. This
part further notes the legal community's preference for providing post-
disclosure remedies and penalties in contrast to statistics' goal of reduc-
ing privacy risks by engaging in appropriate disclosure practices that
minimize privacy.
I. LAW AND PRIVACY
In this part, we document the rise of confidentiality, privacy, and in-
formed consent in three specific contexts: (A) confidentiality of United
States Census data; (B) the emergence of a "right to be let alone;" and
(C) the rise of "information privacy" and continued threats of secondary
uses. In so doing, we note how American jurisprudence has only re-
24. See id.
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cently concerned itself with questions of privacy. Indeed, the concept of
privacy is barely a century old and has been the subject of legal indiffer-
ence for much of that time. Despite the relative novelty of legally pro-
tected privacy rights, policymakers have long recognized tensions be-
tween society's need for data and individuals' fear of misuse. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these tensions often manifested
themselves in a mistrust of governmental purpose, particularly with re-
gard to participation in the United States Census of Population and the
Census of Manufactures. As the nineteenth and twentieth centuries pro-
gressed, however, government policies addressed these concerns by de-
veloping three distinct legal frameworks: (i) confidentiality of personal
information; (ii) regulatory pledges to avoid secondary unintended uses
of personal information without informed consent; and (iii) enacting
sanctions, if seldom used, to punish government agencies or agents that
breach confidentiality and informed consent requirements.
A. Privacy and the United States Census
The original United States Census, conducted in 1790, was consid-
ered by some to be inaccurate and poorly administered.25  Despite the
simplicity of the survey, consisting of a mere six questions,26 individual
compliance and disclosures were less complete than many had hoped.27
25. According to one commentator, "On every side loud complaints were heard, both of the
results of the census and the methods used. Lunt, infra note 37, at 73. See also HARVEY M.
CHOLDIN, LOOKING FOR THE LAST PERCENT: THE CONTROVERSY OVER CENSUS UNDERCOUNTS 42
(1994).
26. The 1790 Census asked respondents to disclose: (1) name of head of family, (2) number
of free white males over sixteen, (3) number of free white males under 16, (4) number of free white
females, (5) number of other free persons, and (6) number of slaves. MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE
AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 14 (1988). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, DECENNIAL CENSUS: OVERVIEW OF HISTORICAL CENSUS ISSUES
8-9 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98103.pdf [hereinafter Decennial
Census]. Note that in 1790 no forms were provided to enumerators: the marshals submitted their
results in a form convenient for themselves, and this led to non-uniform reporting of results.
ANDERSON, supra.
27. Substantial disagreement continues to revolve around the claim that the 1790 Census
resulted in an undercount of U.S. citizens. Compare WRIGHT & HUNT, infra note 35, at 16-17 (not-
ing widespread belief that 1790 consensus resulted in a substantial undercount), The Special Com-
mittee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, The Undercount of the Census, 36 REC. ASS'N
BAR CITY N.Y. 24 (1981) and Lunt, infra note 37; with Frederick G. Bohme & David M. Pemberton,
Privacy and Confidentiality in the U.S. Censuses-A History 2 (1991) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author), Jeffrey S. Crampton, Comment, Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: Dispelling Some
Myths Surrounding the United States Census, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 71, 71 (1990), and HYMAN
ALTERMAN, COUNTING PEOPLE: THE CENSUS IN HISTORY 205 (1969) ("Were the census results
really so inaccurate? Probably not.").
Whether the 1790 Census undercounted Americans in any substantial way or not, the
reasons why some chose not to participate in the census were varied. Some chose not to participate
in the census based on Biblical concerns. According to 2 Samuel 24, King David's stubborn insis-
tence on a census for conscription purposes resulted in a plague. See Bohme & Pemberton, infra note
44 (noting that in the first census and occasionally after that, some people opposed the census on
religious grounds.). Others feared the misuse of census data to impose government taxes. See
sources cited infra note 29. However, there is little evidence that any resistance to the census was
based on privacy concerns. See ALTERMAN, at 205; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS
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Although inaccuracies may have been caused by numerous factors, some
viewed individual unwillingness to participate out of fear of government
abuse of information as one cause.28 President Washington, for his part,
attributed the public's reticence to an "apprehension that [the census]
was intended as the foundation of a tax."
29
The fear of secondary uses, grounded in an abiding mistrust of gov-
ernmental purpose, 30 has been a long-standing obstacle to willing partici-
pation and disclosure in statistical studies.3' In the earliest years, United
States officials ignored the underlying problem of mistrust and, instead,
focused their efforts on coercing compliance. Congress adopted a simple
strategy for increasing compliance-substantial penalties were imposed
on individuals for failing to comply with census takers.32 No rules or
procedures were employed to ensure that data would be kept confidential
or otherwise used appropriately by the census takers or the government.33
This coercive system is illustrative of early federal statistical practice-a
general lack of concern for privacy or confidentiality and a view that
coercive tactics were the best way to assure citizen compliance.
The early census not only sought compliance and accuracy through
coercive fines, but it also employed a form of community policing. Be-
tween 1790 and 1840, census results were posted in "two of the most
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY: 1790 - 2002 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/conmono2.pdf [hereinafter Census Confidentiality]. For a
more general discussion of citizens' unwillingness to participate, see CHOLDIN, supra note 25, at 42
(noting that individuals refused to participate in the census on religious and other grounds).
28. See generally MARGO ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FEINBERG, THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST
AMERICAN CENSUS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE OF CENSUSTAKING: REPORT OF A
WORKSHOP, 11-12 (1999), http://lib.stat.cmu.edu/-fienberg/DonnerReports/FirstCensus.pdf.
29. Washington and others also believed that non-participation was motivated by various
concerns. See generally ALTERMAN, supra note 27, at 204-05. See also Davis, infra note 36, at 2
("[T]he problems of communication and travel . . . must have been a contributing factor [to the
undercount]. The suspicion that census data would be used in levying future taxes may also have
played a role in the reluctance of some citizens to cooperate.").
30. For a general discussion of the rise of American mistrust of government, see GARY
WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT (1999); Gary
Orren, Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST
GOVERNMENT 77, 81 (Joseph S. Nye et al., eds., 1997) (detailing the "mounting disillusionment"
since the 1950s).
31. The issue has been raised, most recently and forcefully, in Freedom of Information Act
requests for information gleaned from the census and other administrative surveys. See generally
Michael Hoefges, et al., Privacy Rights Versus FO1A Disclosure Policy: The "Uses And Effects"
Double Standard In Access To Personally-Identifiable Information In Government Records, 12 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS J. 1 (2003) (discussing the evolution of legal doctrine as it relates to derivative
uses of information taken from the U.S. Census); Jeffrey D. Zimmerman, United States Department
of State v. Ray: The Distorted Application of the Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption
to Repatriated Haitian Migrants, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 385 (1993).
32. In 1790, individuals who refused to participate in the census or cooperate with census-
takers could be fined $20. See ALTERMAN, supra note 27, at 195; DAN HALACY, CENSUS: 190
YEARS OF COUNTING AMERICA 33 (1980). Over time, these penalties were increased. Id at 144-45.
33. Penalties were imposed, however, for marshals or assistants who either failed to make
returns or falsified data. See Lunt, infra note 37, at 72 ("A penalty of $200 was prescribed .... ).
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public places" within each enumeration district.34  These acts imposed
duties on all marshals to publicly post all returns in order, ostensibly, to
provide individuals the opportunity to review their forms for accuracy.
Just as important, however, as a second chance at accuracy was the hope
that public posting would allow others in the community to note who
either failed to file a return or did so inaccurately or falsely.35 Through
public posting of returns, census regulators sought to shame non-
participants through public exposure and, ostensibly, to discover poten-
tial mistakes. 36 The zeal to garner complete and correct data drove these
early measures-not privacy or confidentiality grounded in any nascent
individual right.37
As the century progressed, and despite some initial success, the
government's compliance campaign ran into renewed opposition. By the
mid-nineteenth century, individual compliance was faltering and inaccu-
racies in the census were unacceptable.38 Blame was partly directed to
abuses of census data by various officials suspected of exposing survey
results for personal gain, curiosity, or respondent embarrassment. 39 Fur-
ther exacerbating privacy concerns was Congress' insistence that the
34. JASON G. GAUTHIER, MEASURING AMERICA: THE DECENNIAL CENSUSES FROM 1790 TO
2000 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/polO2marv-ptl.pdf. See e.g., Act of Mar. 1,
1790, 2 Stat. 101 (providing United States census standards). In addition to the public posting re-
quirements, enumerators were also, under penalty of law, required to file copies of all census sched-
ules with clerks of the district courts for acceptance and presentation to the grand jury. Id at 102. A
fine of $200 for assistants was imposed for such failures while the marshals were liable for $800 for
each violation. Id.
35. See CARROLL D. WRIGHT & WILLIAM C. HUNT, THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF THE
UNITED STATES CENSUS, S. DOC. No. 56-194, at 926-27 (1st Sess., 1900) (Census enumerators were
to "cause a correct copy, signed by himself, of the schedule, containing the number of inhabitants,
within his division, to be set up at two of the most public places within the same, there to remain for
the inspection of all concerned .... ).
36. Posting of census results not only served to stigmatize those who did not respond but also
allowed data respondents to conduct their own error checks-a result clearly envisioned by the
Census Act's authors. Timothy Pickering, the main author of the 1800 revisions to the original act,
believed that public posting of census results that identified individuals helped correct errors in the
census: "[It] appears to be that if any of the inhabitants discover errors in the enumerations, they may
be made known to the assistant; and the naming of the heads of families will render the detection of
errors practicable." Robert C. Davis, Confidentiality and the Census: 1790-1929,
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/appenc.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2005) (citing
TIMOTHY PICKERING, CIRCULAR TO MARSHALS, (April 30, 1800), in PICKERING PAPERS). See also
Census Confidentiality, supra note 27.
37. See generally Edward C. Lunt, History of the United States Census, I PUB. AM. STAT.
ASS'N 90 (1888). As stated in a more recent article:
If the framers of the U.S. Constitution thought that the census might be viewed as an in-
trusion on personal privacy or foresaw any need to keep census data confidential, their
misgivings were not evident when they approved Article 1, section 2, providing for a de-
cennial census.
Census Confidentiality, supra note 27, at 1. See also Davis, supra note 36 ("[T]hese requirements
involved disclosure, but apparently the confidentiality issue was not raised. Given the few facts
contained in the schedule, all of which were common knowledge locally, it is probable that most
citizens did not perceive the public posting of census results as an invasion of privacy.").
38. See Davis, supra note 36 (discussing discourse among the populace and government
following the act for the census of 1840).
39. See id (detailing the importance of confidentiality as matters of private life increasingly
became subjects of census questions).
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subject matter of the census increase beyond mere head-counting.4 ° Over
time, the limitations of the initial surveys were improved to provide fur-
ther information to government policymakers. 4' The increase in ques-
tions and the rise of individual mistrust of government uses of data led to
the first frameworks for assuring the confidentiality of census data. As a
result, by the mid-nineteenth century, various directives were issued or-
dering that census data be kept strictly confidential.42 Stopping short of
legal penalties against violators, the policy by 1850 was clear:
40. By 1850, the census not only included detailed questions involving manufacturing and
commerce (which had been included, off and on, in censuses as early as 1810) but detailed informa-
tion including:
The schedule for the free population would list every inhabitant by name, giving, in addi-
tion, sex, age, color, nativity, place of birth, marital status, literacy, real estate ownership,
and information as to whether the individual was deaf, dumb, blind, insane, idiotic, or a
pauper or convict. The slave schedule was less inclusive, but more detailed than ever be-
fore. A mortality schedule listed by name all who had died in the preceding year, with
personal and medical details included.
See Davis, supra note 36. As a result of the increase in reported data and their sensitivity, the re-
quirement of public posting was finally abrogated in 1850. See id.
41. Despite its practical limitation, the census was viewed, from its inception, as an invaluable
tool to "enable [Congress] to adapt the public measures to the particular circumstances of the com-
munity .... [And] to make proper a provision for the agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing
interests ...in due proportion." I ANNALS OF CONG. 1115 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwaclink.htmil (follow "Browse the Annals" hyperlink; then
follow "1st 1789-91" hyperlink; then follow "1st session" hyperlink listed under "House"; then enter
"1115" in the box).
42. As noted earlier, census instructions issued in conjunction with each taking of the Census
of the Population and, when it was administered, the Census of Manufactures had not, prior to the
mid-nineteenth century, included any provisions for the confidentiality of census data. Indeed, a
review of the 1820 instructions, for example, reveals that census-takers were more focused on the
legal obligation of individuals to provide census information (while noting the sensitivity of com-
mercial data). According to the 1820 instructions:
[Census takers] will be careful to observe an important distinction between the in-
quiries directly necessary to the enumeration, and those relating to manufactures;
they will see that.., each and every free person... is obliged to render.., a true
account.., upon a penalty of $20; but as the act lays no positive injunction upon
any individual to furnish information upon the situation of his property, or his pri-
vate concerns, the answers to all inquiries of that character must be altogether vol-
untary, and every one, to whom they are put or addressed, will be at liberty to de-
cline answering them at all.
John Quincy Adams, Instructions to Marshals-Census of 1820, reprinted in WRIGHT & HUNT,
supra note 35, at 136. The 1830 instructions included identical language regarding individuals'
requirement to provide legal assistance on the Census of the Population. See Martin Van Buren,
Instructions to Marshals-Census of 1830, reprinted in WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 140-41.
By 1840, however, issues of confidentiality had begun to creep into the instructions.
According to the 1840 instructions:
Objections, it has been suggested, may possibly arise on the part of some persons
to give the statistical information required by the act, upon the ground of disincli-
nation to expose their private affairs. Such, however, is not the intent, nor can be
the effect, of answering ingenuously the interrogatories. On the statistical tables no
name is inserted-the figures stand opposite no man's name; and therefore the ob-
jection can not apply. It is, moreover, inculcated upon the assistant that he consider
all communications made to him in the performance of this duty, relative to the
business of the people, as strictly confidential.
Instructions to Marshals-Census of 1840, reprinted in WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 145. As
we can see, by 1840 the census was already contemplating two modem notions of privacy and con-
fidentiality. First, that private information would be kept confidential through statistical methods (in
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[A]ll marshals and assistants are expected to consider the facts in-
trusted [sic] to them as if obtained exclusively for the use of the Gov-
ernment, and not to be used in any way to the gratification of curios-
ity, the exposure of any man's business or pursuits, or for the private
emolument of the marshals or assistants, who, while employed in this
service, act as the agents of the Government in the most confidential
capacity.
43
The primary concern for the confidentiality of information in 1850, how-
ever, was disclosing sensitive information about business or property, not
individual information. 44 Despite this admonition, disclosure of census
information was not criminalized until decades later.45 Public posting of
information, however, was soon abolished and, from 1850 on, census
records were considered "confidential" pursuant to administrative pol-
icy.
46
Over the next few decades, however, it appears that census agents
were failing to abide by this policy. In 1870, the Census Office was re-
quired, once again, to reiterate its policy that "No graver offense can be
committed by Assistant Marshals than to divulge information acquired in
the discharge of their duty. All disclosures should be treated as strictly
confidential .... The Department is determined to protect the citizen in
all his rights in the present Census. ' ' 7 One of the chief proponents of the
increased rules for confidentiality, Representative James A. Garfield,
summed up the concern that individuals were not properly protected
from secondary uses: "[t]he citizen is not adequately protected from the
danger, or rather the apprehension, that his private affairs, the secrets of
his family and his business, will be disclosed to his neighbors.
'A8
Still unwilling to criminalize improper disclosures, the Census Of-
fice escalated its attempts to ensure confidentiality by requiring newly
minted "census enumerators''9 to swear to maintain the confidentiality of
this early instance, merely insisting that names did not appear next to data) and, second, that those
charged with gathering the information would keep all data confidential.
43. The author of the circular was disturbed by the fact that:
Information has been received at this office that in some cases unnecessary exposure has
been made by the assistant marshals with reference to the business and pursuits, and other
facts relating to individuals, merely to gratify curiosity, or the facts applied to the private
use or pecuniary advantage of the assistant, to the injury of others. Such a use of the re-
turns was neither contemplated by the act itself nor justified by the intentions and designs
of those who enacted the law. No individual employed under sanction of the Government
to obtain these facts has a right to promulgate or expose them without authority.
WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 150 (quoting Thomas MacKennan, Circular to the United States
Marshals and Assistants (1850)).
44. See Bohme & Pemberton, supra note 27, at 5-6.
45. See Davis, supra note 36.
46. See id.
47. WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 156.
48. House Comm. on the Ninth Census, H.R. Rep. No. 41-3, at 49 (1870).
49. By legislative fiat, for the 1880 Census, local officials designated "census enumerators"
were selected to administer the surveys replacing United States Marshals in that regard. See Census
Confidentiality, supra note 27, at 7.
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all individually-identifiable census data.50  As these requirements were
still, apparently, insufficient and Congress finally criminalized disclo-
sures in 1890,5' further expanding the civil and criminal penalties over
the ensuing years: 2 What should be remembered, of course, is that for
all of these censuses, citizens could not legally protect their own privacy
by withholding information-legal sanctions continued to make non-
compliance a matter of criminal law, a policy that remains in place to this
day.
53
50. WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 937. See also Census Confidentiality, supra note 27,
at 8. The Instructions to Enumerators in the 1880 Census told enumerators "to use great courtesy and
consideration. A rude peremptory, or overbearing demeanor, would not only be a wrong to the
families visited, but would work an injury to the census by rendering the members of those families
less disposed to give information with fullness and exactness." GAUTHIER, supra note 34, at 18. The
1880 Census Instructions thus linked public trust with compliance and accuracy, noting that although
participation in the census was required by law, "[e]numerators will, however, do well not unneces-
sarily to obtrude the compulsory feature of the enumeration .... With the high degree of popular
intelligence here existing, the importance of statistical information is very generally appreciated; and
if the enumerator enters upon his work in a right spirit, he will generally meet with a favorable and
even cordial response." Id. at 18-19.
51. Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 319, § § 8, 13, 25 Stat. 760 (1889) (current version at 13 U.S.C. §
214 (2005) (imposing $5,000 fine on enumerators).
52. According to 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (2005):
(a) Neither the Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of Com-
merce or bureau or agency thereof, or local government census liaison, may, except as
provided in section 8 or 16 or chapter 10 of this title or section 210 of the Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1998 or section 2(t) of the Census of Agriculture Act of 1997-
1. use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any purpose other
than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied; or
2. make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment or
individual under this title can be identified; or
3. permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the Department or bu-
reau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports.
53. Although these legal sanctions are rarely applied to nonrespondents, there is evidence that
a reminder that a response is required by law increases the rate of compliance to requests for data
from the census and other mandatory surveys. At the request of Congress (spurred in part by con-
cers about privacy), the Census Bureau tested the effect of different wordings in the letter request-
ing participation and on the envelope sent to persons selected to participate in the mandatory Ameri-
can Community Survey. Persons randomly selected to receive the "mandatory" reminder were sent a
letter saying:
Please take about 40 minutes of your time to assist your community greatly by complet-
ing and mailing back your copy of the American Community Survey, as required by law.
We are conducting this survey under the authority of Title 13, United States Code, sec-
tions 141-193, and 221. That same law protects your privacy. Section 9 requires us to
keep all information about you and your household strictly confidential. We may use this
information only for statistical purposes. In addition, Title 13 imposes severe criminal
sanctions if any U.S. Census Bureau employee violates those provisions. Title 13 also
imposes penalties for not responding to the American Community Survey.
DEBORAH H. GRIFFIN ET AL., MEETING 21 ST CENTURY DEMOGRAPHIC DATA NEEDS-
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY. REPORT 3: TESTING THE USE OF VOLUNTARY
METHODS 6, 18 app. 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/
Report03.pdf.
Other persons in the study-the "voluntary" group--were sent a letter saying: "The U.S.
Census Bureau chose your address, not you personally, as part of a randomly selected sample. The
Census Bureau is required by U.S. law to keep your answers confidential. Your participation in the
survey is important; however, you may decline to answer any or all questions." When the voluntary
survey was used, mail response rates dropped by more than twenty percentage points. Id.
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These views were not couched in a rhetoric of individual rights. In-
stead, their motivations appear to have been grounded in a desire to in-
crease the accuracy and amount of data acquired. Accomplished by crea-
tion of a nascent trust regime, the actions of these early legislators to
force compliance slowly gave way to measures intended to induce
greater voluntary compliance through promises, pledges, and eventually
legal rules that punished those who breached such trust based measures.
These measures, combined with new technologies introduced in the
1890s, streamlined the census process and, at least in part, provided a
greater level of data security5 4 and further worked to build a trust-regime
around the taking, administration, and keeping of the census.
Interestingly, questions of industrial statistics seem to have spurred
greater acknowledgment of privacy concerns. First conducted in 1810,
the Census of Manufacturers (whether as separate form or additional
questions as part of the Census of Population) sought to gather informa-
tion on occupations, income, and other vital statistics necessary, as
President Martin Van Buren later noted, to "exhibit a full view of the
pursuits, industry, education and resources of the country... .,55 Despite
the statistical importance of this information, officials, including John
Quincy Adams, believed disclosure must be voluntary arguing that,
"some individuals will feel reluctant to give all the information desired..
S. ,56 Adams's view appears motivated by the nature of such informa-
tion-the view that some information was more sensitive than others-
an approach that, over time, would become a cornerstone of American
privacy law.
57
Despite paying some lip service to the idea that industrial statistics
were more sensitive and, therefore, deserving of greater privacy, most
objections followed a familiar pattern. Most clearly evinced an abiding
mistrust of the uses of the data, rather than a view that such information
was inherently private. Some critics objected to the census because the
information gathered might be used for other programs: "Is this federal
prying into the domestic economy of the people a precursor to direct
taxes? Is nothing to escape its inquisitors or its tax-gatherers? Is it worthy
of the dignity and high functions of the federal government to pursue
54. See JOEL SHURKIN, ENGINES OF THE MIND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER FROM
MAINFRAMES TO MICROPROCESSORS 78 (1996).
55. WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 36.
56. Id. at 136 (quoting John Quincy Adams). A late nineteenth century writer noted that:
Much of the value of any census must come from the sympathetic co-operation [sic] of
the people examined; and in the first half of this century information was given much
more reluctantly than now. No penalty was attached in 1840 to a refusal to comply with
the requirements of the industrial investigation; and in some cases the people refused
point-blank to answer the inquiries of the census-taker.
Lunt, supra note 37, at 82.
57. See infra Part IC.
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such petty investigations? ' 58 Fears of prying, and a felt-right to avoid the
prying eyes of government and others, would soon launch the first
wave59 of legislated privacy.
In the end, the view that the United States Census could be adminis-
tered through coercion and force was a clear failure. As the century pro-
gressed, concepts of confidentiality and prohibitions on secondary uses
were gradually made part of the regulatory framework of conducting the
census. Over time, these initial pragmatic steps would become en-
sconced in law through the emerging right to privacy. In the end, how-
ever, the conduct of the United States Census has always reflected the
balance between disclosure and confidentiality. As the Supreme Court
noted in Baldrige v. Shapiro60 nearly 100 years after confidentiality was
first guaranteed for census participants: "Although Congress has broad
power to require individuals to submit responses, an accurate census
depends in large part on public cooperation. To stimulate that coopera-
tion Congress has provided assurances that information furnished ... by
individuals is to be treated as confidential.'
B. The Right to be Let Alone
As the United States government was cajoling the citizenry into full
and honest participation in censuses, others became increasingly con-
vinced that some information was inherently private. Individual privacy
was emerging as an important social and legal issue throughout the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century.62 The last two decades, in particular,
witnessed the development of new privacy-invasive technologies, such
as the portable camera, that gave rise to calls for the legal protection of
individual privacy.63
This nascent privacy movement was given its most articulate and
forceful support through the work of two jurists, Louis Brandeis and
58. See JAMES D. B. DEBOW, STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES: BEING A
COMPENDIUM OF THE SEVENTH CENSUS 12 (Richard E. Easterlin et al. eds., Gordon & Breach,
Science Publishers, Inc. 1970) (1854).
59. See infra Part lB.
60. 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
61. Baldridge, 455 U.S. at 354.
62. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335 (1992);
Thomas H. O'Connor, The Right to Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MASS. L.Q. 101, 102
(1968); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 113-249 (1972). Other areas of
law were expanding the zones of privacy beyond traditional notions of eavesdropping and home
entry prohibitions. For example, Congress passed a law in 1825 making it a crime for a post office
employee to open another's mail. See 42 U.S.C. § 1702 (1825), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1703
(2005).
63. Attribution for the coining the term "right to be let alone" is generally given to Judge
Cooley who, in his work years prior to that of Warren and Brandeis, made reference to the phrase,
"to be let alone," which he described as a right of personal immunity. See THOMAS M. COOLEY,
COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). See also DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881)
(holding that woman had "right to the privacy of her apartment" during childbirth that "the law
secures" against attempts by defendant to enter).
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Samuel D. Warren. 64 Upset at the erosion of personal privacy caused by
newspaper reporting 65 and photography, 66 these two lawyers penned
what is generally considered one of the "most influential law review arti-
cles of all."67 In this article they articulated what has become the basis of
much privacy law in the United States-the right "to be let alone. 6 8
Although Brandeis and Warren's ideal of privacy contained elements of
elitism and privilege, the basic notion that individuals possessed a right
to be let alone soon became law.
Within a decade, judicial opinions began to recognize a right to pri-
vacy,69 and legislation 70 and state constitutional7 1 approval soon fol-
lowed. By the mid-twentieth century, this initially academic right was
protected through four distinct torts:72 (i) false light;73 (ii) misappropria-
64. See Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMp. PROBS. 326 (1966).
65. According to Daniel Solove: "In the second latter half of the 19th century, newspapers
were the most rapidly growing type of media. Circulation of newspapers rose about 1000% from
1850 and 1890, from 100 newspapers with 800,000 readers in 1850 to 900 papers with over 8 mil-
lion readers by 1890." DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW 10 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--445181 (follow "Stanford Law School" hyper-
link to download pdf document).
66. The rise of portable, "instant" cameras was of great concern to Warren and Brandeis and,
as they argued, upset the prior balance of consent, trust, and contract that previously protected indi-
viduals against such intrusions:
While, for instance, the state of the photographic art was such that one's picture could
seldom be taken without his consciously "sitting" for the purpose, the law of contract or
of trust might afford the prudent man sufficient safeguards against the improper circula-
tion of his portrait; but since the latest advanced in photographic art have rendered it pos-
sible to take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate
to support the required protection.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193,211 (1890).
67. See Kalven, supra note 64, at 327.
68. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66, at 195.
69. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (holding that use
of a photograph and name in an advertisement constituted an invasion of privacy). But see Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (holding that defendant's use of plaintiff's
likeness in advertising without permission was not actionable under New York common law).
70. For example, in 1899, the California legislature amended its libel statute to include publi-
cation of a person in a newspaper or book, and other media, without consent. DON R. PEMBER,
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 64 (1972). See
also Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (N.Y. Civ. Rts §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1976 & Supp. 1988)) (prohibiting the use of a person's name or likeness without consent when used
in advertisements or trade publications and passed in reaction to the Roberson decision cited supra
note 69).
71. The earliest mention of privacy-related rights in state constitutions may be found in the
original Washington and Arizona constitutions, adopted in the early 20th century. See WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law."); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (employing identical language as Washington). Admit-
tedly, these provisions only weakly relate to a concept of privacy as Warren and Brandeis intended.
It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that numerous states amended their constitutions to
include specific rights of privacy. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
72. Identification and naming of these torts is attributed to Prosser. See generally, William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
73. See Neil B. Hayes & Douglas J. Sylvester, The Law of Online Privacy, in BUSINESS LAW
& THE INTERNET § 15.20 (Michael B. Simon et al., eds. 2002):
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tion;74 (iii) public disclosure of private facts;75 and (iv) intrusion upon
seclusion.76
Each of these bases for protection, however, was largely inapplica-
ble against government data collection efforts. 77 On one hand were vari-
ous legally mandated data collection efforts, such as the census and tax
returns. On the other, torts do not protect information once disclosed,
providing little protection against secondary uses.78 Finally, government
bureaucracies increasingly made data disclosures by citizens nearly im-
possible to avoid, even where legal sanctions were inapplicable.
As the twentieth century progressed, individuals' increasing interac-
tion with government, through Social Security, driver's licenses, and
numerous other administrative iterations, led to an increasing amount of
personal data falling into the hands of government administrators.
79
These disclosures are voluntary in only the strictest sense of the word as
"[i]ndividuals cannot reasonably avoid many government transactions,
like getting a driver's license. 80 In addition to increasing government
collection practices, private data collection ventures multiplied including
the founding and proliferation of numerous commercial and personal
credit rating institutions.81 As the amount of data in governmental and
To prevail on a claim of false light, a plaintiff must generally prove a publication made
with actual malice that places the plaintiff in a false light and that is highly offensive to a
reasonable person.... [T]he false light tort requires a showing of actual malice or that
the defendant either "knowingly" or "recklessly" disseminated such false information.
74. Id. at § 15.21 ("To prevail on a misappropriation claim, a plaintiff must generally prove
that the defendant appropriated the defendant's name, likeness, or other image and used it for some
commercial gain or advantage.").
75. Id. at § 15.22 ("[T]he elements of a public disclosure claim are a public disclosure of
private facts that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.").
76. Id. at § 15.23 ("The elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion are (a) an intrusion
into an area in which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy and (b) that the intrusion is
highly offensive to the reasonable person.").
77. See, e.g., id at § 15.24.
78. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitu-
tion, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1176 (2002) ("One of the longstanding conceptions of privacy is that it
involves secrecy and is lost once information is disclosed.") [hereinafter Solove, Access].
79. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY 605-18 (1977) available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report (noting how the
adoption of a national social security number was necessary to provide the means for government to
track social security benefits for individuals). See also Eric Grossman, Conceptualizing National
Identification: Informational Privacy Rights Protected, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1007, 1009-10
(1986).
80. Id.
81. Equifax, for example, was founded in 1899. Dun & Bradstreet and Moody's, two highly
influential commercial credit rating companies, were founded in the mid-nineteenth century and rose
to prominence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Jeffrey S. Adler, Capital and
Entrepreneurship in the Great West, 25 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 189, 194 (1994); RICHARD SYLLA, A
HISTORICAL PRIMER ON THE BUSINESS OF CREDIT RATINGS 2, 8 (2001),
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/HistoricalPrimer.pdf.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
private hands increased, new legal protections for privacy and informa-
tion control crept into the law.
8 2
C. Information Privacy
Tort-based privacy ultimately proved too limited to preserve both
the privacy of individual data and the trust and willingness of individuals
to provide that data. By the 1960s, the development of new data storage,
linking, and mining technologies greatly increased both the need for
more data and potential for abuse.8 3 In turn, individuals became increas-
ingly concerned about "the condition of not having undocumented per-
sonal information about oneself known by others."8 4 Public unease with
emergent capabilities was aggravated by numerous high-profile abuses of
government-held data. 85 These factors ultimately led to a second wave
of privacy law concerned, chiefly, with the protection of personal infor-
mation.
This second wave of privacy was largely sparked by journalistic and
academic writings detailing governmental data abuses and aggressive
surveillance by law enforcement in the 1970s.8 6 By the mid-I 970s, jour-
nalists and other commentators had uncovered and substantiated a cul-
ture of widespread lawlessness and surveillance by the FBI, CIA and
other governmental agencies.8 7 Revelations that successive administra-
tions had increased the surveillance budgets and activities of numerous
federal agencies, including illegal wiretaps of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
and other public figures,88 greatly increased fears of an imminent "Big
Brother." Fears of surveillance soon combined with fears about misuse
of collected data. As part of these larger surveillance efforts, it soon
became clear that government agencies were also combing through pub-
lic data files from the IRS and others.8 9 In addition, increasing attention
was being paid to the effect that financial credit data, controlled and dis-
82. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability
for Intrusion in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1044-54 (1995); Diane L. Zimmerman, Req-
uiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
291, 297 (1983).
83. William A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 287-88
(1983).
84. Id. at 269.
85. MORTON H. HALPERIN, ET AL., THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 1-12 (1976); VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 229-51 (1964).
86. For one of the first and most influential writings giving rise to increased public attention
towards privacy concerns see PACKARD, supra note 85 (examining the rise of credit bureaus and
financial profiling); see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); JERRY ROSENBERG,
THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969); ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE
SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY (1972) (detailing rising public privacy
concerns using survey data); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
87. See, e.g., HALPERIN, supra note 85 at 1; ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:
COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 125-68 (1971).
88. See, e.g., WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 140-42 (1998).
89. See generally HALPERIN, supra note 85.
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seminated through various credit bureau companies, could have on nu-
merous areas of life.90
The United States' tentative steps towards stronger privacy laws
were deeply affected by events in Europe. Increasing controversy over
data-privacy programs in Europe, including disturbing revelations about
Nazi Germany's use of census data to locate and exterminate German
Jews, 91 led to an increased interest in constraining both government data-
collection and usage practices and, in particular, to a backlash against
comprehensive government databases.92 The fight in Europe against
national identity cards, censuses, and other statistical databases was
widely reported in the United States. Within the United States, the pri-
vacy debates spurred by the Watergate scandal and the Church privacy
hearings 93 were also reaching a fever pitch.
The result of these revelations was twofold. First, there was a sub-
stantial breakdown in trust between individuals and government data
collectors. Various polling data from the period demonstrate how pri-
vacy fears and mistrust blossomed in this period of government intru-
siveness. 94 These polls, first conducted in 1968 and then again in 1974-
78 asked whether individuals felt that "sometimes your sense of privacy
is being invaded or not-that people are trying to find out things that are
not any of their business." 95 Nearly two-thirds of those who responded
90. See PACKARD, supra note 85, at 168-82.
91. See generally J. ADAM TOOZE, STATISTICS AND THE GERMAN STATE, 1900-1945: THE
MAKING OF MODERN ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE 36-37 (2001). Jutta Wietog documented changes in
the Census Act during the Third Reich: while the German Census Act of 1933 stated the obligation
to maintain secrecy and allowed the data to be used only for statistical purposes, the 1939 Census
Act "no longer mentioned the obligation to maintain secrecy" and permitted the data to be used
"only for the specialpurposes of the census. But these special purposes were not defined anywhere."
Jutta Wietog, German Official Statistics in the Third Reich With Respect to Population Statistics,
Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute (2003), available at http://www.isi-
2003.de/guest/3601 .pdfMltabObj=pcoabstract%26MIcolObj=uploadpaper%/o26MInamObj=id%26
MlvalObj=360 l%26MItypeObj=application/pdf (paper presented at the 54th Session of the Interna-
tional Statistical Institutes, Aug. 15, 2003). The 1939 Census asked specifically about Jewish ances-
try. Id.
92. See generally William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, The Dark Side of Numbers: The Role
of Population Data Systems in Human Rights Abuses, 68 SOCIAL RESEARCH 481 (2001).
93. See Thomas S. Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United States:
Beyond the Balancing Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT
BALANCE 33, 34 (2003), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/opengov/ ("Only after
Watergate and Vietnam, when Congress finally investigated the intelligence agencies, did the
American public learn" of government data abuses and cover-ups). Reports prepared by the Church
Committee are available at Paul Wolf, Cointelpro, http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/
cointel.htm. See also Alice Robbin, The Loss Of Personal Privacy and Its Consequences for Social
Research, 28 J. OF GOV'T INFO. 493 (2001). According to Robbin:
During the 1970s, public anxiety was a catalyst for legislative hearings, the enactment of
federal and state statutes, and implementation of administrative policies, regulations, and
guidelines to safeguard privacy and create enforceable expectations of confidentiality for
personal information that was collected by government, financial institutions, and the so-
cial research community.
Id. at 494.
94. Robbin, supra note 93, at 495-97.
95. Harris Poll #1815 (Mar. 1968), cited in id. at 495.
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in 1968 did not feel that their privacy was being invaded.96 By 1974-78,
as the actions of government unfolded, the responses changed dramati-
cally, with 80% in 1974 and 98% in 1978 responding that they did feel
their privacy was under threat.
97
The United States scandals and European abuses also led to a judi-
cial and legislative backlash. During the 1960s and 1970s few, if any,
laws existed to curb government excesses. Wiretap surveillance, al-
though circumscribed in part by early statutes, 98 was largely unregulated
and, indeed, subject to the administration's view that "national security"
overrode other obligations to refrain from surveillance activities.99 As a
result, various judicial opinions and, finally, legislative enactments, were
promulgated to protect individuals against government intrusions via
wiretapping and other technologies. 100  In addition to these anti-
surveillance measures, various laws were proposed to protect data held
by federal agencies and private financial and medical entities.
Unlike most European countries, the United States did not enact a
comprehensive privacy regime, choosing instead to: (i) protect the pri-
vacy of data and records held by the federal government; and (ii) protect
privately held financial and medical data. Among the numerous regula-
tions and statutory enactments of this period are: (i) the Federal Privacy
Act of 1974 ("Privacy Act"); 01 (ii) the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA");'0 2 (iii) the Family Educational Right to Privacy Act
96. Robbin, supra note 93, at 495-96.
97. According to Robbin:
By the mid-1970s, however, the Watergate Affair and the Nixon Administration's highly
publicized wiretapping and surveillance activities radically altered Americans' assess-
ment of the importance of personal privacy. Between March 1974 and April 1978,
Americans became very concerned about privacy in their personal life, with between
90% and 97% in March 1974 (Harris Poll #7481) and June 1976 (Harris Poll #7684), re-
spectively, rating privacy as "very important" in their personal life. However, by April
1978 (Harris Poll #7804), the percentage of respondents who ranked privacy as "very
important" declined to 79%.
Id.
98. Federal Communications Act of 1934 § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1996) ("[N]o person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the exis-
tence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person."). The Supreme Court in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1957), restricted the scope
of § 605 to prohibit only the disclosure of tapped communications-not the wiretaps themselves.
99. See generally John Podesta & Peter Swire, Speaking Out About Wiretaps, WASH. POST,
Aug. 30, 2002, at A23.
100. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (striking down Alabama statute that
attempted to force the NAACP to disclose its members' names); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967) (holding that wiretap of defendant's phone-booth telephone calls violated defen-
dant's "reasonable expectation of privacy"); Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2002) (generally referred to as the "Wiretapping Act", this enactment
greatly curtailed the ability of government to engage in wiretaps without warrants).
101. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2004)) [hereinafter Privacy Act].
102. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002), amended by Electronic Freedom of
Information Act Amendment of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-23 1, 110 Stat. 3048 to 3054 [hereinafter
FOIA].
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("FERPA");' °3 (iv) the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"); 1°4 and (v)
regulations governing social security, employment, education, health,
and other records. 05 These enactments, although substantially improv-
ing the privacy and confidentiality of federally controlled and other sen-
sitive data, did not achieve all that privacy advocates had hoped. Instead,
these measures sought to retain the balance between access and privacy
set up during prior regimes by emphasizing trust-promoting measures
that penalized post-collection disclosures and set out guidelines for ap-
propriate data disclosures. The privacy regime set up at the end of the
second privacy wave focused on three main goals: (i) assuring individu-
als that government-held data would not be used for secondary purposes
without permission; (ii) securing privacy as an individual right to be
overcome only by showings of substantial countervailing need; and (iii)
providing a check on unrestrained government by opening up databases
and practices to public scrutiny. 10 6 These three goals, as well as the lim-
103. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2002); 34 CFR §
99 (2004) [hereinafter FERPA].
104. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681-81x (2004) [hereinafter FCRA].
105. For example, regulations governing the disclosure of personal information by the Internal
Revenue Service echo those of the more general Privacy Act-although not enacted until 1976-
including provisions regarding the publication of statistical studies. "No publication or other disclo-
sure of statistics or other information required or authorized [by various provisions] shall in any
manner permit the statistics, study, or any information so published, furnished, or otherwise dis-
closed to be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.
I.R.C. § 6108(c) (2004). See also I.R.C. § 6103 (2005) (making tax returns and information confi-
dential and prohibiting disclosures without specific Congressional authorization); I.R.C. § 7431
(2004) (creating a civil remedy for unauthorized disclosures). See also Allan Karnes & Roger
Lively, Striking Back at the IRS: Using Internal Revenue Code Provisions to Redress Unauthorized
Disclosures of Tax Returns or Return Information, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 924 (1993).
The Social Security Administration is similarly obligated to maintain confidentiality of
records in its possession. See Social Security Act § 1106 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2004)).
The Census Bureau is also subject to legislation mandating the confidentiality of survey
data. See 13 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (2005) (census data must be kept confidential). See also McNichols v.
Klutznick, 644 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981) (census data not subject to ordinary discovery in suit
challenging apportionments).
Not all administrative agencies have always operated under similar confidentiality restric-
tions. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, for instance, was never legally required to keep information
confidential although, as a matter of agency practice and policy it is so required. See Confidential
Nature of BLS Records, COMMR'S ORDER 3-93, §7(a) (Dep't of Labor Aug. 18, 1993) ("[D]ata
collected .. .under a pledge of confidentiality shall be treated in a manner that will ensure that
individually identifiable data will be used only for statistical purposes and will be accessible only to
authorized persons."). See also George T. Duncan & Stephen F. Roehrig, Mediating the Tension
between Information Privacy and Information Access: The Role of Digital Government, in PUBLIC
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 94, 99 (G. David Garson, ed., 2003) (noting that BLS is not legally
obligated to secure the confidentiality of individually identifiable data).
106. See generally Ronald Backes, Freedom, Information, Security, 10 SETON HALL CONST.
L.. 927, 936 (2000) ("The FOIA rests upon a foundation of open government and the need in a
democratic society for public disclosure of information concerning government operations.");
Heather E. Kilgore, Signed, Sealed, Protected: Solutions To Agency Handling Of Confidential Busi-
ness Information In Informal Rulemaking, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 519 (2004); Department of Justice,
Office of Information and Privacy, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE (2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foi-act.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005) (providing an extensive overview
of the FOIA including its history and judicial treatment).
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ited nature of legal protection, can be seen in the overarching structure of
the major privacy laws of the period.1
0 7
The Privacy Act of 1974, for example, sought to control the "impact
of computer data banks on individual privacy"'1 8 but limited its reach to
federally controlled data banks.'09 Intended, as Marc Rotenberg has
claimed, to "set out a comprehensive regime limiting the collection, use
and dissemination of personal information held by government agen-
cies,"110 the Act placed a number of administrative burdens on the collec-
tion, analysis, and sharing of data by federal agencies. Among these
burdens were requirements that agencies make it possible for individuals
to: (i) determine what data or records have been collected or otherwise
held by affected agencies;"'. (ii) prohibit or restrict the ability of agencies
to use data for purposes other than those for which it was originally col-
leted;112 (iii) gain access to, copy, and amend or correct, any data held by
affected agencies;" 3 (iv) be assured that federally-held data is secure,
current, and used solely for lawful purpose;' 1 4 and (v) pursue civil penal-
ties against agencies or individuals that violate these rules. 115 Despite
these various empowerments, the privacy of collected data was still sub-
ject to a number of exceptions and limitations-the most significant of
which is a provision allowing agencies to disclose information for "rou-
tine uses" that are "compatible" with the reasons for original collec-
tion.116
Partly intended to combat unrestrained government surveillance by
granting individuals the right to view any federally controlled records
about them, the Privacy Act also sought to grant individuals control over
their records. 117 Its provisions were based, in large part, on a Code of
Fair Information Practices ("FIP") put forth by the then-Department of
107. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy: (What Larry
Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (2001).
108. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE & COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY
ACT OF 1974, S. 3418 (Public Law 93-579), at 300 (Sept. 1976) [hereinafter PRIVACY ACT:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
109. The official legislative history declared the Act a "landmark achievement in securing for
each citizen .. .the right of privacy with respect to confidential information held by the Federal
Government." Id. at v.
110. Rotenberg, supra note 107, at 39.





116. § 552a(a)(7); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
117. Privacy Act, supra note 101.
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Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973.118 Among the various ap-
proaches outlined in the FIP are:
1) A prohibition against the keeping or creation of secret databases;
2) The principle that individuals must have the means and ability to
access and, if necessary, correct their data and records;
3) A prohibition on the disclosure or use of collected data without
explicit informed consent by respondents as to such disclosures or
uses;
4) A requirement that all data collectors, analyzers, and handlers take
steps to ensure the security and accuracy of all data. 1
19
According to the Privacy Act, no federal agency may "disclose any
record [about an individual] ... except pursuant to a written request by,
or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record
pertains." 120 As many have noted, "the Privacy Act begins from a pre-
sumption of personal control over government-held data and vests indi-
viduals with the power to waive privacy in such data at their own discre-
55121tion.
Placing control in the hands of the individual to whom the informa-
tion pertains accomplishes a number of goals. First, it grounds the Pri-
vacy Act's provisions in an individual right to personal privacy (rather
than a mere factor in an overall cost-benefit analysis). Second, it ensures
that individuals have the power to inspect government records and prac-
tices-promoting accountability and democracy. Finally, it assures indi-
viduals that their data, once voluntarily disclosed for one purpose, will
not be used for another or shown to a third party without explicit consent.
This framework, clearly intended to restore confidence in the confi-
dentiality of personal records, was also balanced by a keen understanding
of the importance of data sharing.122 The data sharing provisions are
motivated, in part, to promote open government. In particular, the Pri-
vacy Act and its confidentiality and privacy guarantees are subject to
numerous exceptions, including conforming to requests for data under
the Freedom of Information Act.123 In addition to this important goal, the
118. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, Sec.
V (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/c5.htm.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2004).
120. § 552a(b).
121. RAUL, supra note 11, at 24.
122. Id. ("Congress ... recognized that the proper policy for government-held personal infor-
mation consists of a delicate balance between privacy and access.").
123. The Privacy Act, despite its broad support of personal control over data nevertheless
included numerous exceptions intending to seek a delicate balance between privacy and access
including:
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Privacy Act also contains an explicit nod to statisticians' concerns as
noted in the Privacy Act's relationship to the Federal Reports Act, 12 4 a
statute that dictates the circumstances under which data can be shared
between federal agencies.
The Privacy Act was enacted after the FOIA and is subject to
FOIA's rules mandating public access to government-held records.
12 5
Incorporating the above-mentioned principle that open government fos-
ters democratic governance in an era of feared tyranny, the FOIA em-
powers "any person" to request "records" maintained by federal agen-
cies.1 26 At first blush, this principle seems antithetical to the pro-privacy
regime of the Privacy Act and others. After all, the data requested by
"any person" include, quite possibly, individually identifiable data that
the affected individual would rather keep silent.
To avoid gutting the privacy framework based on individual con-
trol, trust, and access, FOIA contained two specific privacy promoting
1. To the agency's own officers or employees;
2. Pursuant to an FOIA request;
3. For routine agency uses provided such uses are disclosed to the public;
4. The Bureau of Census for purposes of carrying out the census or other official sur-
veys;
5. To statisticians and researchers solely for statistical research or reporting provided
such records do not identify individuals;
6. To a US jurisdiction for law enforcement purposes;
7. To Congress;
8. Pursuant to a court order;
9. To a Consumer Reporting Agency in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(1-12)(2004).
124. For an overview of the Federal Reports Act of 1942, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3511 (1942)
[hereinafter FRA], see John V. N. Philip, The Paperwork Reduction Act in United Steelworkers of
America v. Pendergrass: Undue Restriction and Unrealized Potential, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 922-
23 (1989). Although recently overhauled by the e-Government Act of 2002, the FRA governed the
sharing of information between federal agencies on four conditions:
1. If the information is in the form of statistical totals or summaries;
2. If the information was not collected under a confidentiality guarantee;
3. If the persons supplying the information consent to its transfer; or
4. If the receiving agency has mandatory authority to collect such data.
FRA, supra. Later amendments to the FRA required federal agencies to submit request for further
data gathering to the Comptroller General who must approve the proposed surveys-to avoid dupli-
cation. See generally Federal Records Act, 44 USC § 3101 (1950) (establishing the framework for
records management programs in Federal Agencies). One of the more important enactments requir-
ing the publication of reports and statistical data to be publicly disclosed. See The Brooks Act, Pub.
L. No. 89-306, 92 Stat. 2541, Pub. L. No. 95-595, 31 U.S.C. § 68a (2004). According to this Act, the
Department of the Treasury must render overall Government financial reports to the President, the
Congress and the public, Under this Act, each agency must furnish the Secretary of the Treasury
with reports and information relating to the agency's financial condition and operations as the Secre-
tary may require for effective performance. The Secretary's responsibilities include the system of
central accounting and financial reporting for the Government. The Brooks Act, Pub. L. No. 89-306,
Pub. L. No. 92-582, 40 U.S.C.§ 901 et seq. See also Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)). Under this Act, Congress requires that government agencies submit all proposed information
gathering, included in proposed regulations, to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
approval.
125. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(2), (f) (2005)
126. § 552(a)(3)(A).
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rules: (i) "personnel and medical files and similar files... which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy";' 27 and (ii)
"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . ..
which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy,"' 28 were exempt from disclosure. Statisticians,
in particular, viewed the initial exceptions to FOIA requests as narrow-
merely imposing the need to balance the privacy of individuals against
the proposed public goods (including transparency, efficiency, and tai-
lored rulemaking). 129 However, the consequence of embedding privacy
into the framework of individual, and occasionally constitutional, rights
led to an increasing tendency of judges and regulators to privilege the
right of the individual to his privacy over that of the countervailing pub-
lic goods arising out of forced disclosure. 30
Through the 1960s and 1970s, various statutes were enacted that
imposed some level of responsibility on data collectors to protect the
confidentiality of data in their possession. FCRA, 131 for example, passed
in 1970, regulates the collection and use of personal information by con-
sumer credit reporting agencies ("CRAs").13 2  Burdens are placed on
CRAs to protect consumer credit data13 by, at least in part, 134 only pro-
127. § 552(b)(6).
128. § 552(b)(7)(C).
129. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, infra note 155. President Johnson, in
signing FOIA into law, declared:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A democracy works
best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits. No
one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public interest.
Lyndon B. Johnson, 2 PUB. PAPERS 841 (1967), (quoted in H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 8 (1996)),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3451).
130. See Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 477-78 (1995) (noting courts' preference to value individual privacy over
data access and open government); Hoefges et al., supra note 31, at 16-17 (noting same).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005).
132. A "consumer reporting agency" is generally defined as any entity that regularly engages
in the creation and dissemination of consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1a(O.
133. Credit data are generally included as part of a general "consumer report." A consumer
report is defined as a report touching on an individual's creditworthiness, credit standing, credit
capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living. 15 U.S.C. §
1681 a(d).
134. The FCRA imposes a number of affirmative obligations on CRAs. In particular, CRAs are
required to implement "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" in all reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). In addition to this overarching obligation are a number of specific directions:
1. CRAs, or parties acting on consumer reports, must inform individuals of any adverse
actions taken as a result of information contained within a consumer report.
2. CRAs must ensure that consumer reports do not contain obsolete data.
3. When an individual disputes information contained in a consumer report, the CRA
must delete that information if it cannot confirm the information's accuracy within 30
days.
4. CRAs must delete any obsolete or incorrect data as soon as possible after discovery
or notice.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e.
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viding such information for "permissible purposes,"' 35 including strict
penalties for disclosures considered impermissible.' 
36
FERPA was passed in reaction to the "the growing evidence of the
abuse of student records across the nation."' 3 7 FERPA, like other regula-
tions of the period, favored an individual rights model of privacy protec-
tion and imposed liability against data collectors for impermissible re-
leases of private data.' 38  FERPA specifically granted students the sole
right to access educational records for inspection and review'39 and for-
bade educational institutions from releasing such records without explicit
permission 40 subject to numerous exceptions.' 4' As with other laws,
these new exceptions assured respondents that such data, once disclosed,
would only be used for statistical purposes and would not be disclosed to
any third parties for any purpose. 142 As we will explain, this strong pri-
vacy regime was not to outlast the security jangles following 9/11.143
All of these laws, and the various regulations governing control of
information in individual agencies, not only sought to promote individual
privacy rights, but also worked to reassure individuals that data in gov-
ernment hands for statistical purposes would not be used for secondary,
non-statistical, purposes such as tax or other law enforcement. Various
commentators have noted how "[m]ost individuals agree to provide per-
sonal information to ... governments because the benefits [outweigh] the
price of diminished privacy."'144 However, "[t]he cornerstone of that
agreement... is the individual's assumption that the information will not
be used for purposes other than those for which it was collected."'
' 45
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
136. The FCRA includes robust civil and criminal penalties against violators. It authorizes
private lawsuits and provides for the recovery of economic and, in some cases, punitive damages as
well as costs and fees. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n - 1681o. Criminal penalties are also available for those who
fraudulently obtain consumer reports from CRAs or for officers of CRAs for intentional unauthor-
ized disclosures of consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681q - 1681r. Finally, the FCRA contains a two-
year statute of limitations that requires actions to be brought "2 years after the date of discovery by
the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability." 15 U.S.C § 168 lp(l). Most courts
have held that the statute of limitations under the FCRA runs from the date of the violation by the
CRA. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989); Houghton v. Ins.
Crime Prevention Inst., 795 F.2d 322, 324 (3d Cir. 1986); Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 961
(l1th Cir. 1985).
137. 121 CONG. REC. 13,990 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Buckley before the Legislative Confer-
ence of the National Congress of Parents & Teachers, Mar. 12, 1975).
138. According to the sponsors of the Act, "[tihe purpose of the Act is two-fold - to assure
parents of students . . . access to their education records and to protect such individuals' rights to
privacy by limiting the transferability of their records without their consent." 120 CONG. REC.
39,862 (1974) (Joint Statement in Explanation of Buckley/Pell Amendment, Dec. 13, 1974).




143. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
144. Carol R. Williams, Note: A Proposal for Protecting Privacy During the Information Age,
I 1 ALASKA L. REV. 119,134-35 (1994).
145. Id. at 134-35.
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Law enforcement activities of the 1960s and 1970s raised fears that
statistical and individually identifiable data in government hands for ad-
ministrative or research purposes could quite easily be co-opted for en-
forcement purposes.146 The Privacy Act's, FERPA's, FCRA's, and other
laws' prohibitions on secondary uses were intended to counteract these
fears and restore confidence in the benign and beneficial nature of gov-
ernment purpose. In some cases, courts have imposed a "secondary use"
element to determine whether disclosure requests under FOIA are too
intrusive of individual privacy rights. 147 As we shall see, the fear of sec-
ondary uses rekindled following 9/11 is driven not only by renewed
dread of government malfeasance but also by a pervasive sense of pri-
vacy erosion caused by private-sector data collection efforts.
48
The lack of a comprehensive privacy law governing the collection
and dissemination of personal information by the private sector forced
the courts to consider the extent to which privacy was protected by the
Constitution. Privacy advocates, generally frustrated at the lack of a
comprehensive "right to information privacy" sought recognition of the
right in United States courts. 149 Despite these efforts, the courts have yet
to explicitly recognize such a right-but they have come pretty close. In
1977, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute requiring the report-
ing of certain medical prescriptions. Rejecting a lawsuit by physicians
and patients that the statute violated their right to privacy, the Supreme
Court concluded that an individual's right to privacy, with "roots in the
Constitution," was implicated, but found that the statute sufficiently pro-
tected that right.'5 ' In a later decision, the Court held that "both the
common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the
individual's control of information concerning his or her person."'
' 52
Many other cases have continued to expand and clarify this "right to in-
formation privacy," but none have held it applicable to data once dis-
closed.
153
146. Cf United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 751-52 (1989) (example of feared conduct).
147. Hoefges et al., supra note 31, at 25 (noting that "the Court seemed to suggest that secon-
dary effects of disclosure were relevant" to determining the level of intrusion into personal privacy
by allowing disclosure) (referring to Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982)).
148. Cristi Allen, Trust in Government, DECISION ANALYST, June 13, 2001,
http://www.decisionanalyst.com/publdata/2001/Attitudes.asp (showing the declining trust in the
federal government, particularly information collecting agencies).
149. Appellee's Brief at 15-20, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976 WL
181401.
150. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
151. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
152. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 764.
153. See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160, 165-66 (2004)
(holding that because family did not disclose the materials, the right of privacy was still intact);
United States Dep't. of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 177-78 (1993) (implicitly assuming that no
right of privacy attaches to data once disclosed).
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In the end, at the close of the second privacy wave, legislation and
judicial decisions had gone far in restoring trust between respondents and
federal data collectors by focusing on two main principles: (i) individual
control over the use of and access to their data records; and (ii) legally
mandated requirements that data collectors control access to data. Rather
than focusing on the comprehensive privacy protections that many de-
sired, the legislative response sought no more than to restore a balance
between access and privacy through a legal regime that focused on trust
and accountability. As President Ford noted in 1976:
I do not favor establishing a separate Commission or Board bureauc-
racy empowered to define privacy in its own terms and to second
guess citizens and agencies. I vastly prefer an approach which makes
Federal agencies fully and publicly accountable for legally mandated
privacy protections and which gives the individual adequate legal
remedies to enforce what he deems to be his own best privacy inter-
ests. 
154
Although not the comprehensive approach that many desired, it appears
that the balance sought by the limited reach of the Privacy Act, the
FOIA, and similar statutes was largely successful in increasing voluntary
compliance with federal statistical surveys and studies.
III. PRIVACY IN STATISTICAL PRACTICE
The above discussion on the rise of privacy in American law paral-
lels the development of statistical society codes of conduct. In particular,
this section notes how statistical societies and practice, despite a different
emphasis on the importance of individual privacy, have long been con-
cerned with privacy, both as an individual right and as a source of trust
enhancement in statistical agencies. As in the legal arena, statistical con-
cepts of privacy and confidentiality developed in concert with contempo-
rary technological and political changes, and we argue that much of the
present day confidentiality ethos in statistics responds to issues from the
first two waves of privacy concern.
As the Ad Hoc Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality for the
American Statistics Association noted in 1977:
Efficiency in terms of cost, accuracy, timeliness, and convenience
through use of existing records and limited transfer of records among
designated agencies for purposes agreed to by the affected agencies
should be balanced against any added risks to privacy that such trans-
fers may entail. Demands for collection of particular items of infor-
154. PRIVACY ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 108, at 956.
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mation should always be subject to the check of the expected social
benefit-to-cost ratio.155
At the same time as the government is seeking to protect individual
privacy, it is requiring both private industry and public agencies to col-
lect ever increasing amounts of data. 156  In addition to these concerns,
there is an increasing pressure for efficiency, both economic and legal.
157
Economic efficiency requires agencies to share data they collect-it is
deeply wasteful, obviously, to require the same data to be collected twice
for legitimate government programs. Yet, as we have seen, law's at-
tempts to fulfill the promise of individual liberty and sensitivity result in
a general prohibition against secondary uses in the absence of explicit
prior consent without sufficient regard for the potential value of such
uses and the minimal (or potentially minimalized) danger to privacy.
15 8
Much of the preceding material has focused on a history of the con-
cept of privacy in law with some reference to statistical approaches; in
law the conception of privacy as a right, and in statistics the idea of a
necessary balance between the responsibilities of confidentiality to the
respondent and data access to the public. In this section we note that,
statistical societies were founded with the goal of bringing the benefits of
statistical analysis to society.' 59 Many of those benefits depend on hav-
ing summary statistics, or even portions of data collected, available to the
citizenry. As James Madison argued, the census should "embrace some
other objects besides the bare enumeration of the inhabitants" in order to
provide legislators with more information for benefiting the country.160
155. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality, 31 AM. STATISTICIAN 2,
59-78, 60 (1977) [hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc Committee].
156. Stephen E. Feinberg & Leon C.R.J. Willenborg, Introduction to the Special Issue: Disclo-
sure Limitation Methods for Protecting the Confidentialtiy of Statistical Data, 14 J. OFF. STAT. 337,
337-39 (1998).
157. Ivan Fellegi has argued that trust is an essential component of statistical agencies' success
in serving these larger social goals:
[Tihe less trust there is in a society (whether this is based on the assumption of doubtful
integrity or suspected incompetence), the more there is a need for an objective and visibly
unbiased mechanism to resolve real or potential conflicts in the design of government
programs, and to provide information on the basis of which their performance can be as-
sessed once they are implemented. Official statistics, if their provider is truly trusted, can
often serve in such a capacity.
Ivan P. Fellegi, Official Statistics-Pressures and Challenges ISI President's Invited Lecture, 2003,
72 INT'L STAT. REV. 139, 141 (2004).
158. See generally Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, Statistical Policy Working
Paper 2, Report on Statistical Disclosure and Disclosure-Avoidance Techniques 1 (May 1978),
available at http://www.fcsm.gov/working-papers/sw2.html.
159. See infra Part liA.
160. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1115 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwaclink.html (follow "Browse the Annals" hyperlink; then
follow "1st 1789-91" hyperlink; then follow "1st session" hyperlink listed under "House"; then enter
"1115" in the box). Madison's views, however, were not necessarily shared by others at the time. In
a letter to Thomas Jefferson on Feb. 14, 1790, Madison wrote:
A Bill for taking a census has passed the House of Representatives, and is with the Sen-
ate. It contained a schedule for ascertaining the component classes of the Society, a kind
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In 1940, the centenary of the establishment of American Statistical
Association ("ASA"), Halbert Dunn wrote that access to official statistics
is fundamental to democracy itself:
At the birth of this nation about a century and a half ago, the fore-
most thought in the mind of its people was the maintenance of per-
sonal freedom for which the citizen had struggled and for which he
had been willing to die. In recent years, however, a number of fac-
tors have tended to undermine this freedom. The more important of
these are: Concentration in relatively few hands of the agencies
which disseminate information to the public, advancement in the
knowledge of how to control human behavior by the use of psychol-
ogy, and the extremely rapid growth of totalitarian ideology. How
many persons appreciate the importance of the census method and its
resultant statistical information in the maintenance of the democratic
principles to which the country is dedicated?
161
Dunn argued that census data should be readily available, and that
scope, timeliness and availability of census data, "linked to the citizen's
right and willingness to question, will prove a bulwark of strength to our
democracy throughout the next century." 162 In this view, the collection
and analysis of data is not merely an ancillary component of governance.
Rather, the collection of valid statistical data is seen as central and indis-
pensable, not only for good governance, but for any kind of effective
governance. "The government cannot fulfill its regulatory mission
unless those who are subject to the regulations provide regulators with
truthful and relevant information that will enable them to monitor the
activities of the regulated entities for compliance."'' 63 As a result, and as
hinted at in the prior discussions, statisticians and policymakers with
statistical inclinations have long viewed privacy as a necessary compo-
nent of statistical practice if for no other reason than that it promotes
voluntary, truthful, and comprehensive disclosures.
Statisticians have long been aware of the importance of protecting
persons who participate in statistical studies. Although data have been
used for millennia, statistics as a profession is very young with many
dating its origins as a mature and distinct discipline no earlier than
of information extremely requisite to the Legislator, and much wanted for the science of
Political Economy. A repetition of it every ten years would hereafter afford a most curi-
ous and instructive assemblage of facts. It was thrown out by the Senate as a waste of
trouble and supplying materials for idle people to make a book.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 14, 1790), in I THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, at 654
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
161. Halbert L. Dunn, Census-Past and Future, 35 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 242, 242 (1940).
162. Id. at 250.
163. BeVier, supra note 130, at 456 (emphasis added).
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1900.164 Although late in maturing, statistical study, as discussed in the
prior section, has been a subject of governmental interest since the
Founding.
A. The Origins of Statistical Societies
From early in this country's history, scientific associations in the
United States were concerned about official statistics. For example, in
1800, the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences requested Congress
to expand the census and:
[B]egged leave to request their honors to direct by law that the next
census of the inhabitants of the United States might comprehend
much more exactly analyses of the population with respect to age,
might indicate the number of persons not born in the United States,
the number of persons in each leading occupation, the number of
married persons, of widows, and so on. 165
From the outset, the ASA was closely connected with the gathering and
dissemination of official government statistics. On several occasions in
the nineteenth century, the Association petitioned Congress about De-
cennial Census issues or provided advice about the scope and conduct of
the census. 166
The development of statistical study in the United States paralleled
that in Britain, and an examination of the evolution of privacy notions in
both countries is instructive. The Statistical Society of London (now
called the Royal Statistical Society) was established in 1834, and the
ASA followed suit in 1839.167 The prospectus of the Statistical Society
of London stated its purpose to "procure, arrange and publish facts calcu-
lated to illustrate the condition and prospects of society."'' 68 According
to the first constitution of the ASA, the goal of the new society was "to
collect, preserve and diffuse statistical information in the different de-
partments of human knowledge."' 69 The Journal of the Statistical Soci-
ety of London started in 1838 and morphed into the Journal of the Royal
164. STEPHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS: THE MEASUREMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY BEFORE 1900 1 (1986).
165. Lunt, supra note 37, at 75.
166. See R.L. Mason et al., A Brief History of the American Statistical Association, 1839-1989,
44 Am. STATISTICIAN 68, 69 (1990).
167. Id. at 68 (noting that following the precedent in England, it was originally called the
American Statistical Society, but a regrettable acronym prompted a quick name change to "the
American Statistical Association" in 1840).
168. Athelstane Baines, The History and Development of Statistics in Great Britain and Ire-
land, in THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS, THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS IN MANY COUNTRIES
365, 385 (John Koren ed., 1918).
169. John Koren, The American Statistical Association, in THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS, THEIR
DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS IN MANY COUNTRIES 3, 3 (John Koren ed., Burt Franklin, 1918).
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Statistical Society in 1887. Publications of the American Statistical As-
sociation commenced in 1888.
Not surprisingly, since the concept of individual privacy was not
found in other arenas, it is not found to be of paramount concern in the
early history of the statistical societies. Many of the scholarly papers in
the early volumes of the Journal of the Statistical Society of London and
the Publications of the American Statistical Association consisted of
tabulations of agricultural statistics and descriptions relating to statistics
of conditions of laborers, children, trade, manufactures, and other topics.
Many of the authors express the exuberance of a child with a new toy
when noting the possible uses of statistics to help society. The first arti-
cle in the Journal of the Statistical Society of London stated how "every
subject relating to mankind itself, forms a part of Statistics.
'' 70
Until the close of the nineteenth century, statistical practice, like
law, remained relatively unconcerned with privacy. Promoters of statis-
tics such as Florence Nightingale were more concerned with document-
ing the sanitary conditions of hospitals and needless deaths of injured
soldiers in the Crimean War than with protecting their privacy. She
wrote: "I stand at the altar of the murdered men, and while I live, I fight
their cause" and her main weapon was statistical tables and graphs.' 7'
Given these goals, privacy was not of great concern.
B. Confidentiality and Privacy in Statistical Literature
The earliest mention of confidentiality protection found in the pub-
lications of the Royal Statistical Society or ASA related to protecting the
reputations of medical practitioners.172 Benjamin Phillips, surgeon to the
Mary-le-bone Infirmary, wrote that he did not publish the names of the
doctors performing amputations "because there is great difference in the
results, which might easily be explained to the satisfaction of medical
men; but which, in non-professional minds, might readily raise a preju-
dice against the practice of individuals; on which account I have pre-
ferred suppressing the names in the memoir."' 73  As with the United
States Census, the earliest concern about privacy in the statistical asso-
170. Introduction to I J. STAT. SoC'Y LONDON 1, 2 (1839). Many of the articles in the early
issues of the Proceedings begin with a statement of the potential usefulness of statistics for solving a
discipline's problems. See, e.g., Arthur Saunders Thomson, A Statistical Enquiry on Fever, I J.
STAT. SOC'Y LONDON 278, 278 (1838) ("There is no science in which statistical investigation is
more necessary than in medicine; and there are few to which it has hitherto been less applied."). A
common theme of the early articles is the insufficiency of available data, and that better data could
solve the problems of poverty, trade imbalances, public health, and most other societal issues.
171. Edwin W. Kopf, Florence Nightingale as Statistician, 15 PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT.
ASS'N 388, 390 (1916). Florence Nightingale was elected to be the first female member of the Royal
Statistical Society in 1858. Id. at 394.
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ciations was related to commercial and professional interests, not as a
matter of individual dignity or liberty.
The use of the word "privacy" with respect to a right of an individ-
ual occurs much later in the statistical literature and not, at first, in the
United States. One of the earliest discussions of privacy, as the word is
currently understood, was written in 1900 regarding the British Census
and its privacy implications:
The usual conception [of the census] seems to be that a rather seedy
stranger drops a curiously complicated paper (which has to be read at
various angles) containing certain foolish, certain other impertinent,
and other again unintelligible and futile questions concerning one's
maid servant and the stranger that happens to be within one's gates,
and that the said paper is called for the next morning, your inmost
family details unsympathetically perused, probably with the remark
that your declaration of occupation indicates that you do not know
your own business. The one drop of comfort lies in the assurance
that if you find that your wife's age has become the common prop-
erty of your court or alley, you are at liberty to complain of a breach
of official confidence, which, however, is not in England, I believe,
punishable by law.
174
By 1900, in the United States, breaches of confidentiality of census
data and concepts of private information had been introduced into the
law. Soon thereafter, the first explicit mention of privacy in ASA publi-
cations was written in 1908, by Kate Holladay Claghorn. 175 In her arti-
cle, Claghorn expressed concern that "among the host of newcomers into
the statistical field with a fresh idea for a statistical investigation for
every day of the year, it seems as if the preoccupation with each succes-
sive new scheme prevents any critical examination of those already
brought to completion."'' 76 She mentioned the possible harm to the fami-
lies who were being studied in the statistical investigation:
These inquiries are in the main carried on, not merely from pure sci-
entific interest, but for some purpose of social betterment; and it is
not so very long ago that persons with such purposes were warned
over and over again by their guides and advisers of the dangers of in-
vading the privacy of the home and the necessity of keeping strictly
within the limits of confidence, kindness, and personal relation in the
174. J.A. Baines, On Census Taking and Its Limitations, 63 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y 41, 42-43
(1900).
175. Kate Holladay Claghorn, The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Social Work, I 1 PUBL'NS
AM. STAT. ASS'N 150, 164 (1908).
176. Id. at 151.
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work of investigation, which was to be tolerated only in so far as it
was a necessary means for securing the benefit of the family itself.
177
Claghorn balanced the harms of "invading the privacy of the home"
with the benefits to society and insisted that the data collection should
lead to benefits for the specific families being studied.178  Following
Claghom's article, the statistical literature more frequently mentions
privacy of persons who are subjects of statistical investigations and the
importance of keeping their information confidential. 179 By the 1930s, it
is largely taken for granted in statistical literature that the confidentiality
of respondents must be protected. This increasing emphasis on confiden-
tiality in the statistical literature paralleled the changes in the Census
Acts-the 1880 Census Act required enumerators to swear an oath that
they would not disclose information to anyone except their supervi-
sors. 180 The Director of the Census, however, could disclose information
relating to individuals, and in 1917, the Director supplied transcripts of
information to draft boards.' 8' By 1930, however, "the agency began
interpreting confidentiality much more strictly."'
8 2
During the 1940s and 1950s, some statisticians anticipated concerns
that were to be more fully voiced during the second wave of concern
about privacy. Stuart Rice stressed that:
[D]ata supplied to an agency of government for statistical purposes
should not be allowed, through disclosure, to cause individual hard-
ship or disadvantage. It should not be used to support legal action
against the respondent in the courts. It should not fall into the hands
177. Id. at 164.
178. See id. at 164-65.
179. See, e.g., F. Stuart Chapin, The Budgets of Smith College Girls, 15 PUBL'NS AM. STAT.
ASS'N 149, 149 (1916) (outlining the procedures for keeping the data confidential). Chapin noted:
The accounts were strictly confidential. Personal privacy was guaranteed by the follow-
ing plan of administration: the student presidents of every college house distributed the
books in September, and each month reminded the students of their share in the investi-
gation; at the end of the month each student tore off the completed sheet and turned it in;
since each account book and every one of its sheets bore the same number, the final as-
sembling of the nine sheets of any one book was not a difficult matter. The stub, with its
monthly totals, was retained by the student.
Id. at 149
Similarly, respondents to a survey on household expenditure were told:
All information given will be treated as strictly confidential. Particulars respecting indi-
vidual households will not be published or disclosed in any way. You are not asked to
give your name or address anywhere on the form. Your Association will know that you
are filling in a form, but it will not see it when completed; the Civil Service Statistical &
Research Bureau will see the details on the form, but it will not know who has filled these
in.
Philip Massey, The Expenditure of 1,360 British Middle-Class Households in 1938-39, 105 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 159, 162 (1942).
180. Census Confidentiality, supra note 27, at 8.
181. Decennial Census, supra note 26, at 36.
182. Census Confidentiality, supra note 27, at 13.
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of business competitors who would find therein a competitive advan-
tage.1
83
Rice added, however, that concern about disclosure of information
should not become an "unreasoned fetish"'184 that prevented federal sta-
tistical agencies from sharing information with each other. Morton
Kramer was typical among statisticians in the late 1960s in voicing more
contemporary concerns about privacy due to increased technology:
The collection of such data has created concerns on the part of indi-
vidual citizens and members of various groups. .. who believe col-
lection of such data invades the citizen's rights to privacy. These
concerns are aggravated further by fears generated by the spectre of
computers bringing together pieces of information from various offi-
cial records for a given individual and of the possible use of such in-
formation to the detriment of the individual citizen.
185
During the 1970s, reflecting the increased concern about privacy in
all arenas, statistical journal articles, books, and panels concerning confi-
dentiality proliferated. Survey respondents' right to have their data pro-
tected from disclosure was not questioned. The literature still held that
statistical analyses benefit society, but acknowledged the costs, material
and psychological, to respondents. 86  Ivan Fellegi, currently the chief
statistician of Canada, suggested methods and media for data dissemina-
tion that would minimize disclosure risk.
187
Although individual statisticians wrote about the need for protecting
confidentiality of respondents in the professional journals, the statistical
associations did not make formal statements supporting principles of
privacy and confidentiality until after legal changes were introduced.
They did, however, often serve in an advisory capacity to federal agen-
cies on matters of confidentiality. The ASA instituted a Commission on
Statistical Standards in 1949 to develop ethical guidelines for statisti-
cians. The American Statistician published several papers in 1952 on
professional ethics. 188 In these papers, exactly one mention is made of
183. Stuart A. Rice, Problems of Coordinating the United States Statistical System, 49 J. AM.
STAT. Ass'N 438,443-44 (1954).
184. Id. at 444 (italics removed from original).
185. Morton Kramer, Statistics of Mental Disorders in the United States: Current Status, Some
Urgent Needs and Suggested Solutions, 132 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIES A (GENERAL) 353, 392
(1969).
186. See A. Ross Eckler, Statisticians and Shoemakers ("Who is Worse Shod than the
Shoemaker's Wife, " From Heywood's Proverbs), 65 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 9, 17 (1970) (discussing the
psychological costs).
187. Ivan P. Fellegi, On the Question of Statistical Confidentiality, 67 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 7,
15-17 (1972). Another interesting article in this respect is Lester R. Frankel, Statistics and People-
The Statistician's Responsibilities, 71 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 9, 12-13 (1976) (devoting large part of
ASA presidential address to confidentiality issues).
188. See Andrew T. Court, Standards of Statistical Conduct in Business and Government, AM.
STATIsTcIIAN, Feb. 1952, at 6, 6; Morris H. Hansen, Statistical Standards and the Census, AM.
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confidentiality: "If source material is furnished him [the statistician] on
condition that the respondent should not be specifically identified, he
preserves this anonymity."' 89  In 1951, the ASA created an Advisory
Committee on Statistical Policy which dealt with issues of confidentiality
of individual returns.' 90 Jean Gibbons detailed the subsequent history of
ethical codes by the ASA, noting that due to lack of general support, the
issue of a code of ethics "apparently lost its momentum."'
' 91
The issue of a professional code of ethics was revived in the 1980s,
and this time confidentiality concerns played a prominent role. 92 This
led to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee of Professional Ethics
(now a permanent committee) and the 1989 ASA Ethical Guidelines for
Statistical Practice. These guidelines were revised in the 1990s in part to
reflect increasing concerns about confidentiality.' 93
In response to the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in
1966 and the Privacy Act of 1974, the ASA established the Ad Hoc
Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality in 1975.194 The committee
distinguished between administrative and statistical data: the former are
collected "for the purpose of taking action on or controlling actions of an
individual person or other entity,"' 95 while the latter are used only for
calculating statistics such as averages or correlations. 196 "The very es-
sence of statistical analysis is that the identity of individual units of
which it is composed is immaterial. Individuals should not be identifi-
able in the output of a statistical system.', 197 The Committee generally
approved the provisions in the Privacy Act' 98 and emphasized the impor-
tance of the legal protections assuring confidentiality: "Agencies should
not make unqualified promises of confidentiality unless supported by a
legal shield that confers upon the records in their custody unbreachable
protection against disclosure."' 99 In an interesting parallel with modern-
STATISTICIAN, Feb. 1952, at 7, 7-10 (1952); Theodore H. Brown, The Statistician and His Con-
science, AM. STATISTICIAN, Feb. 1952, at 14, 14-18 (1952). These articles were largely concerned
with the statistician's responsibility to produce honest and accurate statistics, to detail limitations of
studies, and to resist pressure from outside forces to obtain desired results.
189. William W. K. Freeman, Discussion of "The Statistician and His Conscience", AM.
STATISTICIAN, Feb. 1952, at 18, 20.
190. See Rice, supra note 183, at 446.
191. Jean D. Gibbons, A Question of Ethics, AM. STATISTICIAN, Apr. 1973, at 72, 75.
192. See Jonas H. Ellenberg, Ethical Guidelines for Statistical Practice: A Historical Perspec-
tive, 37 AM. STATISTICIAN 1, 2-3 (1983).
193. AM. STATISTICAL Ass'N, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR STATISTICAL PRACTICE (1999),
http://www.amstat.org/profession/index.cfm (follow "Ethical Guidelines for Statistical Practice"
hyperlink) [hereinafter ASA GUIDELINES].
194. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 155, at 59. Statisticians also took part in the
debate leading up to the Privacy Act. Id.
195. Id. at 60.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 60-61.
198. Id. at 73. The committee noted, though, that "We find little evidence that federal statistical
agencies have been other than scrupulous about these matters." id.
199. Id.
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day concerns about possible uses of government data for law enforce-
ment,2 °° the committee appeared to be concerned, not that the federal
statistical agencies might voluntarily disclose information, but that they
might be compelled to release information by the courts or through an
executive order.20'
Similar developments occurred in Britain, with one major differ-
ence. In 1971, the Royal Statistical Society was asked by the Privy
Council to nominate representatives to a committee discussing confiden-
tiality of the census.20 2 The Society addressed issues of confidentiality in
its 1977 report to the Data Protection Committee.20 3 In contrast to the
results of ASA deliberations in the United States, the Society preferred to
have the Authority provide a code of conduct for protection of data rather
than legal sanctions:
It is not thought that the Authority needs powers to enforce the use of
such a code of conduct.... [T]he publicity it would give to an infor-
mation system which departed seriously from the code of conduct
would, in our view, be sanction enough to bring serious abuse to an
end, and in any case, the complainant could ultimately have recourse
to the courts.2°
One of the provisions of the Royal Statistical Society report with salient
implications for the post-9/11 world is that national security systems
should have no exemption from requirements of confidentiality.20 5
Concern about privacy and confidentiality in the statistical literature
has largely followed the same waves as found in the legal arena. Corre-
sponding to the current popular concerns about online data gathering and
data sharing, the statistical literature has seen a resurgence of articles and
books about methods for protecting the data of persons participating in
medical studies and surveys. In the third wave of the statistical literature
on confidentiality, much emphasis has been placed on possible statistical
solutions for protecting data from undesired disclosure20 6 as well as
greater risks to data from new computer technology, increased availabil-
ity of databases, 207 and increasingly sophisticated methods for matching
200. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
201. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee; supra note 155, at 69-70 (discussing St. Regis Paper
Co. v. U.S., 368 U.S. 208, 217-20 (1961) (holding that confidentiality considerations do not protect
the subpoena of economic census reports in the hands of a private company)).
202. See generally P.G. Moore, Security of the Census of Population, 136 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC'Y: SERIEs A (GENERAL) 583 (1973) (discussing the results of the committee).
203. Evidence from the Royal Statistical Society to the Data Protection Committee, 140 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIES A (GENERAL) 210 (1977).
204. Id. at 215.
205. Id. at 216.
206. See generally CHANCE, Summer 2004 (entire volume devoted to confidentiality issues).
207. For just one example, PublicRecordFinder.com provides links to thousands of databases
worldwide, and allows searches by name, address, telephone, social security number, or other pieces
of information. One can access records that include information about current and previous ad-
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data records.2 °8 The ASA continues to take a leading role in promoting
the discussion of privacy issues relating to statistics through the Commit-
tee on Privacy and Confidentiality and places many resources on its web-
site.20 9 Recent writings by statisticians on confidentiality, and various
methods that have been proposed for protecting confidentiality of re-
spondents' information, are discussed elsewhere.
21 0
C. Confidentiality and Statistical Codes of Ethics
The statistical societies, and the statistical literature in general, care-
fully distinguish between privacy and confidentiality. Privacy is gener-
ally viewed in the more traditional legal sense of "the right to be let
alone. 211 Statisticians typically do not view this as the issue most rele-
vant to statistical practice. Some have concluded that "the individual
who wants [to be left alone seeks to invoke] his absolute privacy [and] is
[therefore] unwilling to participate in voluntary statistical inquiries or to
provide data about his personal situation ....,,212
The more common variation on privacy articulated by statisticians
is "confidentiality." Confidentiality is closely associated with informa-
tion privacy as used by the law and, specifically, with the concern for
secondary uses. As one author put it, "[t]he concern about privacy...
centers around the question of making such information available to oth-
ers, possibly unknown to the respondent, without his or her consent,
thereby increasing the knowledge of the 'others' about him., 213 Another
author was even clearer:
Confidentiality is specifically the quality or state of being confiden-
tial (private or secret), i.e., not freely disclosed .... Hence, the confi-
dentiality of information relates to the trust of the provider of the in-
formation that the information will not be inappropriately dissemi-
nated or used in identifiable form to hurt him.
214
The more important distinction between most legal uses of privacy
and the statistics profession's use of the term confidentiality is the source
dresses, birthday, roommates, property, marriage, divorce, legal judgments, bankruptcies, criminal
history, and more. PublicRecordFinder.com Home Page, http://www.publicrecordfinder.com (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005).
208. See generally supra note 206.
209. American Statistical Association Privacy, Confidentiality, and Data Security web site,
http://www.amstat.org/comm/cmtepc/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
210. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
211. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
212. Joseph W. Duncan, Confidentiality and the Future of the US. Statistical System, 30 AM.
STATISTICIAN 54, 55 (1976).
213. Fellegi, supra note 187, at 7-8.
214. Duncan, supra note 212, at 55-56. See also CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE, AND DATA
ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES (P. Doyle et al. eds.,
2001).
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of the default rule in statistics society's various policies.21 5 The codes of
ethics of the major statistical societies emphasize protecting the confi-
dentiality of data given by persons and businesses participating in statis-
tical studies but consistently note the limitations imposed on attempts at
"complete" confidentiality. Some excerpts from various codes of stan-
dards and ethics follow.
* "Protect the privacy and confidentiality of research subjects and
data concerning them, whether obtained directly from the subjects,
from other persons, or from administrative records. Anticipate secon-
dary and indirect uses of the data when obtaining approvals from re-
search subjects; obtain approvals appropriate for peer review and for
independent replication of analyses."
2 16
e "Be aware of legal limitations on privacy and confidentiality as-
surances. Do not, for example, imply protection of privacy and con-
fidentiality from legal processes of discovery unless explicitly au-
thorized to do so."
2 17
* "Fellows shall in their professional practice have regard to basic
human rights and shall avoid any actions that adversely affect such
rights. Enquiries involving human subjects should, as far as practi-
cable, be based on the freely given informed consent of subjects. The
identities of subjects should be kept confidential unless consent for
disclosure is explicitly obtained."
2 18
* "Statistical inquiries involving the active participation of human
subjects should be based as far as practicable on their freely given in-
formed consent."
2 19
* "Statistical data are unconcerned with individual identities. They
are collected to answer questions such as 'how many?' or 'what pro-
portion?', not 'who?'. The identities and records of co-operating (or
non-cooperating) subjects should therefore be kept confidential,
whether or not confidentiality has been explicitly pledged.'2
2
1
215. "The OECD defined a set of privacy principles more than 20 years ago that struck a
balance between the need for the free flow of information and the fundamental human right to pri-
vacy." PAUL ASHLEY ET AL., FROM PRIVACY PROMISES TO PRIVACY MANAGEMENT 1,
http://www.semper.org/sirene/publ/AsSP-02.PrivacyAsNewParadigm-preproceedings.pdf (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005).
216. ASA GUIDELINES, supra note 193.
217. Id.
218. THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY CODE OF CONDUCT 1 (1993), http://www.rss.org.uk
(follow "Professional Membership" hyperlink; then follow "Code of Conduct" hyperlink) (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005).
219. INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE DECLARATION ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, cl.
4.2 (1985), http:/isi.cbs.nl/ethics.htm [hereinafter ISI DECLARATION].
220. Id. cl. 4.5.
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9 "Statisticians should take appropriate measures to prevent their
data from being published or otherwise released in a form that would
allow any subject's identity to be disclosed or inferred.",
221
* "Avoid disclosure or authorization to disclose, for personal gain or
benefit to a third party, confidential information acquired in the
course of professional practice without the prior written permission
of the employer or client, or as directed by a court of law."
' 222
As evidenced by the codes of ethics of the statistical societies, it is
widely held that an ethical statistician protects the confidentiality of the
data provided by subjects in medical studies and by respondents to sur-
veys. At the same time, these guidelines also emphasize the importance
of making data available so that results can be confirmed by independent
investigators and society can benefit from the information.
e "Promote sharing of (nonproprietary) data and methods. As ap-
propriate, make suitably documented data available for replicate
analyses, metadata studies, and other suitable research by qualified
investigators.
' 223
* "Governmental policy decisions regarding public health, criminal
justice, social equity, education, the environment, the siting of critical
facilities, and other matters depend in part on sound statistics."
'224
* "Statistical inquiry is predicated on the belief that greater access to
well-grounded information is beneficial to society. The fact that sta-
tistical information can be misconstrued or misused, or that its impact
can be different on different groups, is not in itself a convincing ar-
gument against its collection and dissemination.
225
* "There can be no absolute safeguards against breaches of confi-
dentiality, that is the disclosure of identified or identifiable data in
contravention of an implicit or explicit obligation to the source.
Many methods exist for lessening the likelihood of such breaches, the
most common and potentially secure of which is anonymity.
' 226
These stated principles reveal a different approach to privacy than
found in law. A review of legislative and judicial approaches to privacy
221. Id. cl. 4.6.
222. STATISTICAL SOCIETY OF CANADA CODE OF ETHICAL STATISTICAL PRACTICE (Draft,
Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.ssc.ca/main/about/codee.html. The Statistical Society of Canada has
perhaps the weakest confidentiality protections of those considered here. Their guidelines, and those
of the Royal Statistical Society, permit court-ordered disclosure. The ethical guidelines of the ASA
and International Statistical Institute do not specify exceptions to confidentiality principles when
directed by a court of law.
223. ASA GUIDELINES, supra note 193, Part IIF.
224. Id. See also infra, Part lB.
225. ISI DECLARATION, supra note 219, cl. 1. 1.
226. Id. cl. 4.6.
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reveals law's tendency to view privacy as an intrinsic individual right-
as a floor for determining permissibility of exchange and intervention.
227
The law makes privacy the starting point for determining permissibility
of statistical practices, thereby elevating it to a position of preference in
the hierarchy of determining what releases are or are not permissible. In
early days of statistics, often a similar "absolute" conception of confiden-
tiality was taken, and "confidentiality was always thought about in terms
of the protection of individual and establishment data and not the release
of data .... In modem statistical usage, however, confidentiality is
often thought of in terms of how to implement confidentiality protections
in practice while maintaining usability of the data.229
The various ethical codes of statistical societies differ on the degree
of protection that should be afforded to respondents, however. The ASA
and the Royal Statistical Society both still emphasize that individual data
collected under a pledge of confidentiality should not be disclosed, but
their codes of ethics do not address the problem that confidentiality may
be violated in spite of the utmost efforts of statisticians. The Interna-
tional Statistical Institute guidelines perhaps best reflect recent thinking,
through the statement cited above, that "no absolute safeguards" are pos-
sible.23° With the advent of new computational and statistical methodol-
ogy that may be used to combine data sources and possibly identify indi-
viduals, it may be time to update the ethical guidelines to address the
new information landscape.
IV. THE LESSONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Legal Lessons
By the end of the 1970s, legal approaches to privacy had generally
settled into a series of broad, if at times inconsistent, principles and regu-
lations intended to strike the balance between privacy and access, trust
and security. As discussed above, the law moved from a pro-disclosure
regime to a newer framework intended to promote the trustworthiness of
government institutions while protecting individuals from bad actors,
poor management, and unintended consequences.
Despite the widespread view that privacy is a right fundamental to
American democracy, it has not, as discussed above, enjoyed long-
standing legal protection.231 Privacy's legal novelty is further compli-
227. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
228. Stephen E. Fienberg & Aleksandra B. Slavkovic, Making the Release of Confidential
Data from Multi-Way Tables Count, CHANCE, Summer 2004, at 5, 5.
229. See id.
230. ISI DECLARATION, supra note 219, cl 4.6.
231. Cf. JUDITH WAGER DECEW, PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 9
(1997) ("In the United States, formal legal protection for privacy has developed only during the last
hundred years.").
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cated by the approach law has taken to the subject. As demonstrated by
the above, the law has taken a piecemeal approach to privacy protection,
shielding individuals and their information in certain circumstances, but
not in others, and prohibiting some practices while promoting others.
Given the multitude of privacy-invocations in American law, it is should
not be surprising that the term itself has been employed in numerous
ways.
In legal circles, privacy is often used as a general term encompass-
ing different and often contradictory values. Some of the more famous
iterations protect an individual's: (i) right of free action, equality, or
autonomy; 232 (ii) physical space (both in ownership and access);2 33 (iii)
freedom of thought and secrecy; 234 (iv) anonymity and seclusion; 235 and
(v) "control over information., 236 It is this last sub-category that encom-
232. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Richard A. Epstein, Decon-
structing Privacy: And Putting It Back Together Again, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1, 9 (Ellen
Frankel et al., eds., 2000) [hereinafter PRIVACY] (noting "the simple observation that the prohibition
against eavesdropping and similar forms of behavior satisfies the condition of formal equality" of
individuals); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Ingrid Schulp-
bach Martin, The Right to Stay in the Closet: Information Disclosures by Government Officials, 32
SETON HALL L. REV. 407 (2002) (analyzing informational privacy in the context of individual dig-
nity and autonomy); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737 (1989) (grounding
privacy in individual autonomy); ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY (1995) (providing a current review of United States privacy approaches and noting their
relationship to concepts of liberty and autonomy).
233. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (privacy offers protection of home
against "warrantless entry."); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1990) (overnight guest has
privacy interest in owner's home); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (privacy
extends to papers in private desk drawers). See also Stephen Daren Blevit, A Tale of Two Amend-
ments: Property Rights and Takings in the Context of Environmental Surveillance, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 885 (1995); David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wire-
less Communication, 8 COMM. L. POL'Y 1 (2003) (privacy rights are intimately entwined with rights
to physical space); Note, Privacy, Technology, and the California "Anti-Paparazzi" Statute, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1367 (1999).
234. See, e.g., KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 181-190 (1988); SISSELA BOK,
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION (1983); Charles Fried, Perfect Free-
dom, Perfect Justice, 78 B.U. L REV. 717 (1998) (discussing the problematic founding of privacy in
issues of freedom of thought and conscience); Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After Septem-
ber 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2002) (discussing the relationship between privacy and secrecy);
Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITr. L. REV. 579 (1986). See also Sandra
L. Macklin, Students' Rights in Indiana: Wrongful Distribution of Student Records and Potential
Remedies, 74 IND. L. J. 1321, 1322 (1999). Macklin notes the many ways that individuals approach
privacy, including her view that
Different people interpret the term 'privacy' differently. For some, it simply refers to 'the
right to be left alone,' while for others it may have a more complex association, such as
'the right' to an abortion. Still for others, it may mean the right to be secure in the soli-
tude of one's own home, free from governmental intrusions.
Id
235. See H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., Privacy and Limited Democracy: The Moral Centrality of
Persons, in PRIVACY supra note 232, at 120-26; Warren & Brandeis., supra note 66; Paul
Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REv. 663, 710 (2004)
("[A]dvances in information technology will unreasonably erode the privacy and anonymity to
which American citizens are entitled"). See also Phillip Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG.,
Autumn 1976, at 7, 8 (characterizing three facets of privacy, broadly characterized as anonymity,
secrecy, and autonomy) (quoted in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977)).
236. Numerous authors have written on this subject. See, e.g., Lloyd Weinreb, The Right to
Privacy, in PRIVACY, supra note 232, at 25, 34 ("When people speak of a right to privacy, they
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passes most of the principles and laws that affect statistical practice and
forms the core of our attention here.
As we have noted above, the second wave of privacy regulation at-
tempted to restore the trust individuals had in government prior to vari-
ous high-profile abuses. In so doing, the laws and judicial decisions that
sought to restore balance to the privacy/access dichotomy and promote
trust in government institutions did so by: (i) grounding privacy in the
rights of individuals to control the original collection and the subsequent
use of most data; (ii) promoting open government wherever possible by
empowering individuals to access records and, in some cases, take action
to correct errors or otherwise hold agencies accountable; (iii) penalizing
agencies and individuals who broke the trust set up by legal frameworks
by, among other actions, prohibiting certain secondary uses; and (iv)
although not discussed above, creating a clear legal distinction between
individually-identifiable data and purely statistical data-imposing
greater legal obligations and administrative burdens on the collection,
use, and dissemination of the former while providing for a far more per-
missive regime for the latter.
1. Privacy Founded in Individual Liberty and Autonomy
The law's emphasis on privacy as a legal, perhaps constitutionally-
based,237 right has important implications for its regulation. In particular,
privacy's categorization as an individual right often works to tip the
scales in its favor when faced with competing requests for disclosure. A
review of legislative and judicial frameworks reveals, as noted above, a
number of different uses of the term "privacy" based on the nature of the
intrusion, the status of the affected individual and the individual or entity
seeking to so intrude, or the kind of information or access requested.
Yet, despite these numerous contexts and differences, legal approaches
to privacy up through the 1970s indicate the law's preference to ap-
proach privacy as an individual right to be protected against intrusions-
whether by other individuals, private industry, or government.
mostly have in mind informational privacy, a person's control over others' acquisition and distribu-
tion of information about himself."); Parent, supra note 83; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Pri-
vacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1151-52 (2002) (arguing that individualized conceptions of privacy
direct approaches to resolving privacy tensions in the Information Age).
237. The most famous, and controversial, attempt to ground privacy in the Constitution is Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Amy Peikoff, No Corn On This Cobb: Why Reductionists
Should Be All Ears For Pavesich, 42 BRANDEIS L. J. 751, 753 (2004) ("Most recently, the Supreme
Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, [539 U.S. 558 (2003)] 'embrace[d] the [Constitutional] right-to-privacy
line of cases that began with its birth control decision in 1965 and culminated 30 years ago in the
abortion decision, Roe v. Wade."'); Anne C. Hydom, Does the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Protect Forced Disclosure of Sexual Orientation?, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237, 238 (2003)
(noting that the right to privacy is never explicitly mentioned in the United States Constitution, but
the Supreme Court has rooted it in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1392 (1992).
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Conceiving of privacy as an individual right results in legal deci-
sions and frameworks that view privacy as the default rule for determina-
tions of the permissibility of data access issues. As a result of this de-
fault rule, laws and legal decision-making place burdens on data-
collectors rather than users and subjects. Indeed, as discussed earlier,
most federal laws place burdens on agencies and other data collectors to
demonstrate that the need for the data outweighs the individual's right to
privacy. The FOIA, although ostensibly neutral or, perhaps even disclo-
sure friendly, has nevertheless been increasingly interpreted as favoring
privacy.238 As several commentators have noted, the FOIA framework,
protecting as it does the privacy of individuals against unwanted access,
has two consequences: (i) courts have, over time, interpreted the individ-
ual interest in privacy in such a way that it must be substantially out-
weighed by the right of public access; 239 and (ii) the strengthening of
individual rights-based privacy has allowed some agencies to use privacy
as a "shield" to prevent otherwise appropriate disclosures.24 °
As many have noted, "the instrumental function that privacy advo-
cates believe a right to informational privacy serves is to support the
freedom of self-definition .... This freedom in turn enhances individual
autonomy ... ,241 Perhaps the clearest indications we have of law's
preference to place privacy in the context of an individual autonomy
right is in the explicit adoption of FIP frameworks in the Privacy Act and
FRCA.242 This framework, as noted earlier, seeks to provide to individu-
als the maximum amount of control over disclosure of their information.
Protecting privacy by focusing on issues of control, disclosure, and ac-
cess is consistent with a conception of privacy as central to protecting
"liberty" 243 and "autonomy ' 244 interests.
238. Hoefges et al., supra note 31, at 26.
239. Id. at 15. ("[S]ince FOIA was passed, the Supreme Court [has] created a framework for
balancing public access and personal privacy interests in disputes over the release of government-
held information .... These cases remain controversial, and commentators have accused the Court
of judicially legislating a balancing scheme that strongly favors individual privacy over public ac-
cess despite evidence of congressional legislative intent to the contrary.").
240. BeVier, supra note 130, at 485. ("[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted [the FOIA] so as
to enhance agencies' ability to invoke them as shields to repel requests that records containing per-
sonally identifiable information about individuals be released."). See also Hoefges et al., supra note
31, at 24. ("[Supreme Court] opinions have made a profound impact on constricting the boundaries
of disclosure under FOIA in privacy cases, and have gone a long way toward skewing the ... bal-
ancing test in a manner that favored withholding over disclosure.").
241. BeVier, supra note 130, at 468.
242. See id. at 468-69, 478-79.
243. See citations in supra note 232. See also Peikoff, supra note 237, at 787; Tamara F.
Kushnir, It's My Body, It's My Choice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act Of2003, 35 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 1117, 1130 (2004) ("[T]he right of a woman to choose to have an abortion is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the right to privacy."); Eileen Fry-Bowers, Controversy And Conse-
quence In California: Choosing Between Children And The Constitution, 25 WHITrIER L. REv. 889,
900-01 (2004) ("[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court held that an offender had a protectible liberty
interest in his privacy and reputation .... ")
244. See BeVier, supra note 130, at 468-69. See also Nonnie Shivers, Firing "Immoral" Pub-
lic Employees: If Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights Protects Employee Privacy
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Interestingly, in the desire to privilege individual rights above those
of the public goods derived from open access, the privacy regimes
erected by the adoption of FIP in the Privacy Act are, ironically, quite
burdensome on individuals.245 For the notice, access, and consent provi-
sions to fulfill their promise of promoting individual liberty and auton-
omy, the individuals so served must be aware of their rights, understand
the nature of the threats posed by releasing their data and, ultimately, be
willing to enforce the rights given.246 To make matters worse, many of
the notice and consent provisions inherent in the FIP and the Privacy
Act, as well as the individual rights model in its entirety, require a spe-
cific knowledge of how to read and periodically search the Federal Reg-
ister because that is where such notices are published.247 Finally, even
where individuals undertake all these responsibilities, their remedies are
greatly limited.248 Government, on the other hand, can quite afford the
few suits that may be brought. In the end, government holds all the
cards--often rendering the individual rights model ineffective as well as
inefficient.
Without passing judgment on this view of privacy, it is worth noting
here for three reasons: (i) it may result in poor exchanges between public
goods and individual autonomy; 249 (ii) it places significant burdens on
Rights, Then Why Can't We?, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 621, 641 (2004) ("Privacy has also been
said to include 'an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity."').
245. See generally, Solove, Access, supra note 78, at 1172 (noting that it is "[flrequently ... up
to the individual to take significant steps to protect privacy [and] ... [i]n many instances, individuals
are never even given notice or an opportunity to assert a privacy interest when records containing
their personal information are disclosed.").
246. Most federal privacy statutes rely on individual enforcement for violations. However,
numerous privacy advocacy groups have been successful in upholding individuals' privacy rights.
See Hetcher, supra note 5.
247. For example, the recent passage of the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical
Efficiency Act ("CIPSEA"), as it relates to the FOIA, does require that any data exchanges between
federal agencies must be publicly disclosed to provide sufficient notice to individuals to object to
such disclosures-however, the notices are printed in the Federal Register-hardly a place where
most people are likely to notice. See 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(6) (2004). FOIA requires a wide variety of
public disclosures of agency data and reports, including publication of proposed rules and decisions,
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(I)(A)-(E) & a(2) (2004), and also all records received and held including a rea-
sonable descriptions of their content, id § 552(a)(3)(A) (2004). It is this last disclosure requirement
that generates much of the FOIA litigation in federal courts.
248. In many cases, individuals are not able to recover damages (FERPA) or otherwise engage
in lawsuits against individual agencies for improper disclosures (IRS). But see 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. II 1996); 26 U.S.C. § 7431 (2000) supra Part IIC (stating civil damages for unauthorized
inspection or disclosure of returns and return information must be prosecuted by injured individu-
als); see also Sandra L. Macklin, Students'Rights in Indiana, 74 IND. L.J. 1321, 1326 (1999). Mack-
lin notes:
There was, however, some question about whether FERPA's purpose is to address indi-
vidual records violations or only to prevent systematic violations. The law on its face
does not answer this question, but every court which has addressed the issue has said that
FERPA protects against systematic violations only. While no court has ruled that FERPA
allows a private cause of action, many courts have said that the Buckley Amendment cre-
ates a privacy interest under § 1983.
Id. (ciations omitted).
249. As other have noted, the move toward individual informational privacy deeply affected
statistical practice, although as Robbin seems to imply, not for the worse:
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individuals to enforce their rights;250 (iii) it marginalizes statistical ethics
and practices that favor a more explicit cost-benefit analysis that bal-
ances individual privacy against public goods without privileging either;
and (iv) it does not protect against later government actions that seek to
disrupt traditional barriers against secondary uses because data once col-
lected under a pledge of confidentiality may later lose that status. We
take up most of these issues in another paper that looks at legal changes
following 9/11.251
2. Commitment to Open Government
Closely linked to the argument that privacy is associated with per-
sonal autonomy and liberty, a second characteristic of the second wave
privacy frameworks is a commitment to open government. Evincing
general mistrust or fear of unrestricted government-and appropriately
so given the historical context in which these laws were enacted-this
commitment to open government requires federal agencies to disclose
records they may have, 252 honor public record requests by the public,
253
and obtain individual consent prior to data collection or use for any new
data requests. 4
In contrast to the general free-rein provided to private sector efforts,
this approach conveys "a principled commitment to limited government
powers .... ,,255 As referenced throughout this paper, data access, open
government, and restrictions on data collection and analysis by govern-
ment agencies are often seen as checks against unrestricted and potential
256tyrannical governance. FIP, and the 1973 Report by the Department of
Health, discussed previously, are examples of this approach and, as oth-
ers have concluded, "[t]he lasting legacy of the report and its Code of
Fair Information Practices is the need to protect privacy, at least in part,
The social research community had historically enjoyed a special relationship with gov-
ernment, one that permitted researchers extraordinary access to administrative and statis-
tical records based on their potential contribution for solving social problems .... The
privileged access of the social research community to government information was, how-
ever, irrevocably altered by the mid- 1 970s, as a result of a series of court cases and state
government intrusions into private lives that clarified the failure of existing laws to pro-
tect informational privacy.
Robbin, supra note 93, at 502.
250. See generally BeVier, supra note 130, at 480 (describing the excessive and almost unreal-
istic burden of enforcement placed on individuals).
251. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
252. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2004) (Privacy Act provides that "[n]o agency shall disclose
any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person,
or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual to whom the record pertains .... ).
253. See, e.g., FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2004).
254. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(2004).
255. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REv. 119,127 (2004).
256. See also Katz, supra note 11, at 57.
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as one powerful mechanism for leveling the playing field in a game
where participants have unequal starting positions. 257
Courts have also explicitly acknowledged that access to records
held in government databases-even where such records implicate some
privacy interest-is essential to upholding open government. In 1978,
for example, the Supreme Court, in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc.,258 noted that: "It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a
general right to inspect and copy public records and documents ....
American decisions generally do not condition enforcement of this right
on a proprietary interest in the document or upon a need for it as evi-
dence in a lawsuit., 259 The reason, according to the Court, for such open
access is predicated on the principle that citizens must "keep a watchful
eye on the workings of public agencies .... , 2 6 0
As already noted, however, the commitment to open government is
in some tension with a principled commitment to individual privacy
rights grounded in autonomy: "The difficulty is that as the ambit of pri-
vacy law expands, the amount of information available to the public di-
minishes, thus blocking access to potentially valuable information that
the electorate may need to make informed decisions about self-rule."
26'
3. Focus on Post-Disclosure Penalty Schemes
A further feature of the legal regime arising out of the first and sec-
ond privacy waves was the application of legal penalties against data
collectors for data disclosure and misuse.262 In so doing, however, this
approach penalizes the gatherer and gatekeeper of data-punishing those
who do not adequately protect data while, generally, avoiding penalties
against those who misuse data.263 For example, FCRA imposes penalties
against CRAs that allow data to be released to third parties for improper
uses.264 It does not specifically penalize those who make improper re-
257. Nissenbaum, supra note 255, at 128.
258. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
259. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597.
260. Id. at 598 (citation omitted).
261. Martin E. Halstuck, Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes, 11 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS
71, 73 (2000).
262. For example, census employees who disclose restricted data are subject to criminal li-
abilty. See 13 U.S.C. § 214 (2004) (imposing $5000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both). See
also 13 U.S.C. § 9 (a)(2004) (limiting data disclosure by census employees).
263. For example, recent passage of HIPAA imposes liability against health care institutions
that do not adequately secure data while remaining silent on the penalties to be imposed against
individuals that link data improperly protected or disclosed. See Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 101, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-87) (1996); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1) (2005) (HIPAA's privacy
rule require covered entities to "make reasonable efforts to limit [use or disclosure of] protected
health information to the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclo-
sure, or request."). See also Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records And HIPAA: Is It Too Late To
Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1506 (2002).
264. See FCRA, supra note 104, § 1681(b).
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quests or who otherwise engage in secondary uses of data-although
these individuals and entities may be liable under 
other laws.265
In keeping with this general preference for focusing civil and crimi-
nal penalties against those who either refuse or fail to protect the confi-
dentiality of statistical data, federal agencies are often liable for security
failures and other data releases that do not comport with federal regula-
tions. The focus on disclosure-related penalties does, of course, make a
good deal of sense by placing burdens on collectors to secure data and
control their releases. That said, these frameworks tend to avoid trickier
questions about the uses of data-failing to differentiate between differ-
ent data uses and merely declaring that all disclosures are improper
without consent or regulatory approval.266 For obvious reasons, this fo-
cus may result in either substantial inefficiencies by foreclosing benefi-
cial secondary uses that do not threaten privacy or requiring substantial
security-investments that far outweigh the intrusive nature of the poten-
tial disclosure, or, conversely, allowing for disclosures that may comport
with earlier permissions or regulatory provisions that are injurious to
individual privacy.
4. Differentiated Rules for Types of Statistical Data
Related to the idea that individuals have a right to keep their secrets,
another approach applied to legal privacy frameworks is differentiation
based on the nature of the information disclosed.267 This approach has
two different branches: (i) a differentiated privacy approach for sensitive
versus innocuous data;268 and (ii) a differentiated approach for individu-
ally identifiable data versus anonymous data.269
265. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, for example, imposes liability on individu-
als that access federal computers and cause harm. Electronics Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-3127 (1994); See generally Julie J. McMurray, Privacy In The Information Age:
The Need For Clarity In The ECPA, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (2000); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
of 1986 (CFAA), Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986). The 1986 Act was the first to
include the specific anti-hacking provision under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2002).
266. 13 U.S.C. § 9 regulates privacy of information collected in the census. Section 9 requires
information gathered by the Bureau be kept confidential and be used exclusively for statistical pur-
poses. The statute provides penalties for employees who willfully disclose such information ille-
gally. Section 9(a) expressly restricts the Census Bureau from: (1) using the information for any
purpose other than statistics, (2) making any publication allowing any individual to be identified or
(3) permitting any unauthorized person to examine the census reports.
267. See generally FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 80-100 (1997) (detail-
ing the differentiation of privacy protections based on the nature of the information in question).
268. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) (setting out privacy protec-
tions for financial data); Health Insurance Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.;
26 U.S.C.; 29 U.S.C.; 42 U.S.C.) (setting standards for the privacy and security of individually
identifiable medical data).
269. Bradburn and Straf distinguish between information about individuals and statistical data,
which they define as "a representation of information that does not identify any individual." Norman
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Based on societal standards of sensitivity, certain kinds of informa-
tion are granted higher levels of privacy protection than others. In the
1960s and 1970s, for example, congressional committees and public in-
terest groups urged the federal government to enact privacy legislation to
protect sensitive data such as financial or medical information. 270 In ad-
dition, following the experience of the Holocaust, the importance of
keeping census data confidential quickly became more than just a matter
of trust and voluntary compliance. In making judgments about what
kinds of information to protect, federal law did not approach privacy
from the perspective of the individual, but rather, seemed attuned to a
general "sense" of societal approval for privacy for these data but not
others. As others have noted, this approach captures the widely held
view that "the degree of sensitivity of information [is a] key factor in
determining whether a privacy violation has occurred or not."2 7' Regard-
less of the underlying mechanism, the fact remains that legal responses
have privileged these distinctions.
A second differentiation regime is the law's approach to individu-
ally identifiable data versus data that cannot be used to identify individu-
als, here termed anonymous data. Put simply, federal law and regula-
tions place significant restrictions on data considered to be individually
identifiable-including requirements of informed consent for collection
and disclosure, as well as contractual obligations to ensure confidential-
ity on disclosees. Anonymized data, on the other hand, may be generally
released between statistical agencies and, in many cases, to the general
public, without fear of legal repudiations. This all makes perfect sense
insofar as the risks to privacy are minimized where the individual cannot
be identified.272
However, the concept of "anonymized data"--data incapable of be-
ing manipulated to identify individuals-is far more slippery than com-
monly believed. We are not urging regulators to abandon privacy re-
quirements, nor are we suggesting that a regime of strict liability for dis-
closures that, despite reasonable efforts, result in individual identifica-
tion, become the standards for statistical regulation. Indeed, enactment
of either of these regimes would be a disaster either for the trust that in-
dividuals have in government data or, conversely, would eradicate nearly
all the substantial value derived from data analysis and sharing. That
M. Bradburn & Miron L. Straf, Information and Statistical Data: A Distinction With a Difference.
19 J. OFF. STAT. 321, 322 (2003).
270. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Disclosure of Nonpublic Personal Information, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2000); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Adminis-
trative Simplification, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d, -1 to -8 (Supp. V 1999); Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, Protection of Subscriber Privacy, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
271. Nissenbaum, supra note 255, at 128.
272. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between disclosure risks and the potential
utility of such disclosures, see George T. Duncan & S. Lynne Stokes, Disclosure Risk vs. Data
Utility: The R-U Confidentiality Map as Applied to Topcoding, CHANCE, Summer 2004, at 16.
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said, it is important that, as we come to understand the approach that law
takes, and the choices it makes in enacting one form of privacy regula-
tion or another, the nature of "reasonable efforts" and "anonymous data"
or "data incapable of being individually identified" be taken into consid-
eration in the standards enacted. As we argue elsewhere 273 the current
privacy regime would be greatly served by explicitly recognizing the
right of statistical agencies to focus more on potential uses of data and,
importantly, to use statistical norms to define "individually identifiable"
or "anonymized" data rather than focusing purely on common-sense,
intuition, or market-based notions of reasonable efforts.
B. Confidentiality and Statistical Practice
As seen above, statistical societies' approaches emphasize balanc-
ing the public goods inherent in statistical study with maintaining confi-
dentiality of the data. In so doing, they explicitly acknowledge that in
some cases it may be impossible to keep data completely confidential
and simultaneously useful for society.274 Our history has also revealed
that for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, statistical socie-
ties and their codes of ethics appear to be somewhat behind the law and
public opinion in calling for confidentiality and privacy. Whereas legal
commentators and policymakers began to call for confidentiality and
privacy by the mid-nineteenth century, and entrenched certain privacy
rights into the law by the early twentieth, statistical societies did not
seem to have been as concerned with privacy and confidentiality until the
twentieth century and, indeed, did not seem to have made it of paramount
concern to statistical praxis. Paradoxically, during the last half of the
twentieth century they became a strong advocate for confidentiality of
gathered data.
In this subsection, we discuss these two related emphases of statisti-
cal practice: (i) the balance between data confidentiality and utility; and
(ii) the evolution of statistical societies from organizations committed to
improving the accuracy of statistics to societies also dedicated to prom-
ulgating and implementing ethical standards for modem statistical prac-
tice.
1. Balancing Data Confidentiality and Utility
Many statisticians have called for balancing the disparate demands
for data and confidentiality. Henry Wynn, 1976 president of the Royal
Statistical Society, wrote:
273. Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
274. See ISI DECLARATION, supra note 219, cl. 4.6.
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The importance of getting the balance right between the protection of
an individual's privacy and society's right to open government can-
not be overemphasized .... The increase in the use of computers is
seen as a threat to personal privacy, and it is natural that the Govern-
ment should seek to legislate to protect that privacy.275
Wynn called for caution in going too far to protect privacy: "I certainly
believe that individuals should be protected from misuse of information
on them. However, there is a danger that the balance could be upset and
shift away from protection of the individual and shift towards protection
of data in some more global sense. 27 6 Tore Dalenius took the view that
the Swedish Data Act, in its concerns about confidentiality, curtailed
research too much.277 Dalenius wrote that he did not share the view "that
those responsible for producing statistics are also responsible for ensur-
ing that it is impossible to infer information about individuals from pub-
lished data, if 'impossible' is to be understood literally: the condition
expressed by 'impossible' is too strong. ,278
It is vital that statisticians understand the law's preference to use
"privacy" when it means "confidentiality" and, more importantly, its use
of individual privacy as a right to be overcome upon a showing of strong
public need. The balance between public goods and this right is one that
statisticians should not, and perhaps cannot, take for granted in legal
developments. As this paper has discussed, the evolution of information
privacy law has been increasingly marked by this elevation of individual
privacy. Although spurred on mainly by private industry data collection
practices, it is entirely possible, and in the case of the European Union's
approach a reality, that reactions to private industry data collection and
usage practices can have great negative effect on public service statistical
work.
Official statistics are, in essence, a matter of trust. Politicians, busi-
nesses, and citizens must be able to have confidence that statistics pro-
vided by the federal statistical agencies are accurate and independent of
political pressure. The United Nations Fundamental Principles of Offi-
cial Statistics state:
Bearing in mind that the essential trust of the public in official statis-
tical information depends to a large extent on respect for the funda-
mental values and principles which are the basis of any society which
seeks to understand itself and to respect the rights of its members....
To retain trust in official statistics, the statistical agencies need to de-
275. Henry P. Wynn, Freedom of Statistical Information, 141 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIEs A
(GENERAL) 1, 2 (1978).
276. Id. at 3.
277. See Tore Dalenius, Data Protection Legislation in Sweden: A Statistician's Perspective,
142 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIEs A (GENERAL) 285, 292 (1979).
278. Id. at 297.
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cide according to strictly professional considerations, including sci-
entific principles and professional ethics, on the methods and proce-
dures for the collection, processing, storage and presentation of sta-
tistical data.279
In order to produce accurate statistics, statistical agencies must also
preserve the trust of the public that data they provide will not be used to
harm them. We have seen how the notion of harm from statistics has
expanded from the early ideas about harm accruing from lack of infor-
mation, to possible harm from revealing business data, to the current
embracing of an individual right to control his or her information through
informed consent and assurances of confidentiality. The United States
Census Bureau, anticipating and responding to concerns about privacy,
has increased efforts to assure the public of the confidentiality of its data
collection.28°
Before 9/11, there was every indication that these assurances were
largely working. The 1999-2000 Surveys of Privacy Attitudes concluded
that between 1996 and 2000 there was increased distrust of data sharing
but no increase in distrust of the Census Bureau's confidentiality assur-
ances; an indicator of general privacy concerns in fact declined signifi-
cantly between 1999 and 2000.281 That said, only 25% of people sur-
veyed answered that they are sure that the Census Bureau protects confi-
dentiality of names and addresses, and only 17% said that other govern-
ment agencies cannot get names and addresses of census respondents.282
There is evidence that general publicity about privacy and confidentiality
issues increases concerns about confidentiality of data collected by the
government. 283  At the same time, paradoxically, the public has ex-
pressed willingness for law enforcement agencies to have greater access
to information about individuals.284 The paradox might be explained by
279. UNITED NATIONS, STATISTICS DIVISION, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF OFFICIAL
STATISTICS (adopted 1994), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/statorg/FP-English.htm.
280. The Census Bureau's efforts to assure respondents that their data will be kept confidential
have increased in recent years. A brochure on privacy states that "The Census Bureau Has an Un-
broken Record of Protecting the Public's Privacy[,]" relating incidents when the Secret Service or
other agencies attempted to obtain individuals' census information and were denied. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS2000: THE CENSUS BUREAU GOES ALL OUT TO PROTECT YOUR
PRIVACY 2 (1999), http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d3238c.pdf [hereinafter Census Goes All
Out]. It emphasizes that "[t]he Census Bureau's dedication to confidentiality plays an important role
in everything that it does-including hiring, training, planning procedures and reporting." Id. at I.
281. ELEANOR SINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT ON THE 1999-2000 SURVEYS OF PRIVACY
ATrITUDES 4 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/SPAN-SPA.pdf.
282. Id at 25.
283. Elizabeth A. Martin, Privacy Concerns and the Census Long Form: Some Evidence from
Census 2000, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL
ASSOCIATION (2001), available at http://www.amstat.org/sections/SRMS/Proceedings/
y200l/Proceed/00466.pdf. See also ELEANOR SINGER, CENSUS 2000 TESTING, EXPERIMENTATION,
AND EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC REPORT NO. 1, TR-I, PRIVACY RESEARCH IN CENSUS 2000 4-7
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/TR- I.pdf.
284. See, e.g., Gary Langer, Poll: Americans Believe Stopping Terror is More Important than
Privacy (2004), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/terror poll020610.html ("Seventy-
nine percent say it's more important right now to investigate terrorism, even if that means intruding
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a hypothesis that people are very protective of their own information
(their right to privacy) while wanting the government to have access to
others' data if they think that will lead to greater public safety. Never-
theless, the conflicting desires in the post-9/11 age to have greater pri-
vacy and greater security simultaneously necessitates a revised approach
to confidentiality of privately collected and government data.285
2. Statistical Accuracy and Ethics
One conclusion that can be drawn from the history we have pro-
vided is that statistical societies appear to have lagged behind both public
opinion and law in the call for greater confidentiality and privacy. The
clearest explanation for this appears to be that the statistical profession
rose in the early nineteenth century and took as its first challenge to cor-
rect the perceived deficiencies of prior censuses and other forms of data
collection. Faced with the deficiencies of these early censuses, espe-
cially that of 1840,286 statisticians formed societies in part to urge for
better practice in the conduct and review of the census.
Statisticians were particularly outraged at the use of the 1840 Cen-
sus to support pro-slavery arguments of high "Negro insanity. 287 Un-
able to correct the deficiencies and repugnance of these questions, statis-
ticians founded the ASA to, in part, lobby for a more appropriate 1850
Census.288 Faced with these kinds of disputes, it is hardly surprising that
on personal privacy. Just 18 percent say it's more important not to intrude on privacy, even if that
limits counterterrorism efforts."); Dalia Sussman, Poll. Vast Majority of Americans Say War on
Terror Isn't War on Them (2004), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/
libertiespoll021001.html ("This continues a string of poll results in which most Americans have not
seen the government's anti-terrorism efforts as damaging their rights.").
285. An issue we take up with greater detail in another paper. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note
4.
286. See Davis, supra note 36.
287. Albert Deutsch, The First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840) and Its Use as Pro-Slavery
Propaganda, 15 BULL. HIST. MED. 469, 478-80 (1944). Sadly, Deutsch points out that the eugenic
and deficient bases for the claims of high levels of "Negro insanity" among free versus slaves, were
still prevalent into the mid twentieth century. According to Deutsch:
The flagrant, socially harmful errors of the 1840 census continued to be spread abroad
under the sanction of Congress. The errors repeatedly found their way into lay and pro-
fessional journals. In 1851 the American Journal ofInsanity--now the official organ of
the American Psychiatric Association, under the more recent title, American Journal of
Psychiatry-reprinted without comment a newspaper article, which stated: 'It is obvious,
from the following schedule (taken from the 1840 census), that there is an awful preva-
lence of idiocy and insanity among the free blacks over the whites, and especially over
the slaves.'
Id. at 478. The "findings" of the 1840 Census that free-blacks held a much higher insanity rate was
used in making the pro-slavery arguments that freed blacks were worse off than slaves. Id. at pas-
sim.
288. According to Davis:
Among the many voices raised, the most significant was that of the American Statistical
Association. Founded in 1839, the new organization was an active critic of the official
statistics on Negro insanity, data already being cited in the national controversy over
slavery. As the result of its futile struggle to get corrections made in the Census of 1840,
the Association became committed to the fight for a better census in 1850.
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early statistical societies had more pressing concerns about federal statis-
tical practice than confidentiality or privacy.
Indeed, for most of the nineteenth century, statisticians and statisti-
cal societies were inclined to focus their attention far more on improving
the accuracy and amount of gathered data than they were on the confi-
dentiality or privacy of individuals or their data. As already noted, early
statistical publications and statements consisted mainly of long tables,
analysis of data, and the basic conclusion that, to paraphrase, "if only we
could get more data we could really solve problem x."289 A widespread
view that statistics could cure numerous societal ills is found throughout
the earliest discussions of the profession. 290 Thus, writings of the period
focused more on reforming the practice of statistics, 291 urging greater
scientific method,292 or otherwise proposing reforms to increase statisti-
cal usefulness.293
Those associated with the census were also prone to waxing elo-
quently about the value of statistical analysis. In a speech given to the
ASA, Robert Porter, superintendent of the 1890 Census, defended the
Davis, supra note 36. See also Francis A. Walker, Remarks of President Walker at Washington, 5
PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 179, 183-84 (1897) (discussing Dr. Edward Jarvis' founding of the ASA
and his work "in connection with the ... statistics of the unfortunate classes, particularly the in-
sane.").
289. See Report ofAd Hoc Committee, supra note 155 and accompanying text.
290. Given the nascent nature of statistical societies, it is interesting to look at the writings
from other countries including Great Britain. For example, in an early address by an official of the
British Association (Economic Science and Statistics), it is declared that "There is scarcely a moral
art [that statistics] should not be able to take cognizance." Nassau W. Senior, Opening Address of
Nassau W. Senior, Esq., as President of Section F (Economic Science and Statistics), at the Meeting
of the British Association, at Oxford, 28th June, 1860, 23 J. STAT. SOC'Y LONDON 357, 361 (1860).
In a later address, another English statistician urged his fellows to:
[E]xtend the science which this Society was founded to promote. Statistics... is... in its
essence the science of politics without party colouring; it embraces all the affaires in
which governments, municipalities, local boards, and vestries are concerned. From this
bare announcement its transcendent importance is evident.
William Fan, Inaugural Address Delivered at the Society's Rooms, 12, St. James Square, London,
on Tuesday, 21st November, 1871 34 J. STAT. Soc'Y LOND. 409,409 (1871).
American statisticians, although writing later than their British counterparts, appear
equally enthused about the possibilities of statistical analysis for solving society's ills. Most writings
from the period initially remark on the American appetite for statistical society. See, e.g., Walker,
supra note 288, at 179 (For "the American people... the interest in facts and data of an authoritative
character is greater than anywhere else in the world .. "); Charles F. Pidgin, How to Make Statis-
tics Popular, 2 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 107, 107 (1890) (noting a letter from a distinguished statisti-
cian, that the United States "is hungry for information; everything of a statistical character, or even
of a statistical appearance, is taken up with an eagerness that is almost pathetic."); Henry C. Adams,
Statistics and Economics, an Outline of Statistical Science, with Especial Reference to the Use of
Statistics in Political Economy and Social Science, 1 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 216, 217 (1889) (book
review) ("In this country ... the popular demand for statistical information is constantly forcing the
government to undertake new lines of inquiry.").
291. See RICHMOND MAYO-SMITH, STATISTICS AND ECONOMICS: AN OUTLINE OF SCIENCE,
WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE USE OF STATISTICS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE (Guggenheimer, Weil & Co 1888).
292. See Farr, supra note 290, at 409.
293. See generally Walker, supra note 288 (urging statisticians to be more upfront about the
value of the statistics they collect).
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accuracy and methodology of government statistical practice.294 He was
especially proud of the new electronic tabulating machines (Hollerith)
which, he argued, for the first time enabled tabulation of statistics in any
manner imaginable. 295 He was particularly taken with the view that,
through technology and statistical analysis:
A card which means nothing to the uninitiated is converted into a
pauper or a criminal, whose sin and suffering are as palpable as if the
man himself were bodily present in the room. The groups into which
they are cast are like the divisions of an army from the corps to the
battalion. Under the mysterious influence of the electric current run-
ning through the machine, they organize themselves, as though pos-
sessed of volition, into these groups and sub-groups, with a precision
superior to that shown in any movement of disciplined troops at the
word of military command. I can compare this current to nothing
less intelligent and powerful than the voice of the archangel, which, it
is said, will call the dead to life and summon every human soul to
face his final doom.
29 6
Faced with such enthusiasm it is easy to see why the potential negatives
of statistical practice faded into the background. Indeed, Porter's com-
ments demonstrate how little the concept of confidentiality had changed
since 1810. At one point, Porter discussed how some had urged the 1890
Census to inquire into private economic matters, including mortgage
values.2 97 According to Porter, "[t]he amount of irritation which would
have been aroused ... cannot be estimated. The enumeration of the peo-
ple would have been endangered., 298 As in 1810, statisticians continued
to be concerned about the sensitivity of commercial data solely because
of the detrimental effect such inquiries may have on general data collec-
tion efforts.
Despite these early views about the infallibility or promise of statis-
tics, some tentative efforts at reform were undertaken. Such efforts,
however, focused more on reforming the science and administration of
statistical practice and did not, with rare exceptions, focus on the poten-
tial harms to privacy and confidentiality that would form the core of
more modem discussions. During the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury, for example, the ASA lobbied for a permanent office of the Census
Bureau,299 with the hope that this reform would reduce the inconsisten-
294. See Robert P. Porter, The Eleventh Census, 2 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 321, 322-24 (1891).
295. Id. at 330.
296. Id. at 339 (quoting "Mr. Wines").
297. Id. at 352-60.
298. Id. at 355.
299. American Statistical Association, Permanent Census Office, 7 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1,
1-3 (1901). Numerous other writings demonstrate that statisticians favored establishment of a per-
manent statistical bureau. Some were in favor of a government office and others for private institu-
tions. See Roland P. Falkner, Proposed Statistical Legislation, 3 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 69, 69-74
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cies among statistics collected by different government agencies-a re-
form finally made real in 1902 with establishment of the permanent Cen-
sus Bureau. In his presidential address to the ASA in 1908, Carroll
Wright commented on the newly formed Census Bureau and focused on
the ethical obligation of the statistician to "tell the story of our present
state" that will "endure through all time., 30 0 The focus was, obviously,
to expand the power of statistics -there was no mention of regard for
the confidentiality or privacy of its subjects.
Concurrent publications continued to stress the importance of statis-
tical study for curing society's ills. The preponderance of articles pub-
lished in the first decades of the twentieth century continued to focus on
the inaccuracies and limitations of current statistics-urging for contin-
ued increases in available data and better methodologies to solve prob-
lems.301 Many early articles were devoted to social problems such as
poverty or family desertion, discussions with obvious confidentiality and
privacy implications, but the thrust of these writings was the need to
quantify and classify the problem more accurately-with little attention
paid to the privacy of the study's subjects.
For example, a 1907 article studying disadvantaged children in New
York was concerned with documenting child health problems and, in so
doing, required families under study to list their children's names.302 The
authors of the study did not view this as an intrusion into family privacy
and indeed seemed incredulous that "[m]any families were surprised that
their children's names should... [be] given ... [and] refused to answer
questions as to their living conditions. 30 3 Prominent statisticians also
continued to urge for greater and greater data collection. S.N.D. North,
for example, favored a census conducted every five years since "It has
come to be understood that among the first duties ... of a government to
the people whose welfare is in its keeping is their sanitary and hygienic
protection; and this duty cannot be effectively performed without the
intensive knowledge of the people which only a census affords. ' 3°
(1892) (favoring government census office); Pidgin, supra note 290, at 114 ("There should also be a
Central Statistical Bureau of the United States... organized on a private commercial basis.").
Falkner's article also includes mention of an interesting provision of the proposed statisti-
cal legislation he examined. He notes that the legislation sought to adopt a new method of inducing
compliance with a proposed census on property ownership and debt. According to Falkner, the
legislation included a "curious feature... a provision for the publication of the names of all persons
who refuse to answer the questions." Falkner, supra at 74.
300. Carroll D. Wright, Address of Carroll D. Wright, President of the American Statistical
Association, at its Annual Meeting in Boston, Jan. 17, 1908, 11 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1, 15
(1908).
301. See, e.g., Bradburn & Straf, supra note 269, at 321-25.
302. New York Committee on Physical Welfare of School Children, Physical Welfare of
School Children: An Examination of the Home Conditions of 1,400 New York School Children
Found by School Physicians to Have Physical Defects, 10 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 271 (1907).
303. Id. at 278.
304. S.N.D. North, Uniformity and Co-Operation in the Census Methods of the Republics of
the American Continent, 11 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 295, 298 (1908).
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Kate Holladay Claghorn, who, as mentioned earlier, was one of the
first persons to express concern for individual privacy in the statistical
literature, was also one of the first to express skepticism about the om-
nipotence of statistics.3 °5 Chiefly concerned with the living conditions
facing immigrants in New York, she was a proponent of statistics but
favored focusing on individual conditions in addition to aggregates.3 °6
As a result, she was suspicious of claims that statistics alone could im-
prove society or individual living conditions.3 °7 While registrar of re-
cords in the Tenement House of New York, Claghorn wrote an article,
The Limitations of Statistics,3" 8 in which she critiqued the prevailing
view that more careful collection of data could improve, for example,
government efficiency and effectiveness.30 9 Such views, according to
Claghorn, promised too much from statistical method and reflected "the
present rage for putting every conceivable thing in the shape of 'statis-
tics' and beginning every enterprise of any sort whatever with a long and
elaborate and costly research . ,,310
As statistical societies grew and statistical practice matured, the en-
thusiasm and hope that surrounded the discipline became tempered. The
limitations of statistics were reflected in many of these same writings-
with early twentieth century authors, while still hopeful of statistics'
promise, urging their peers to make statistics more popular,31 more eas-
ily understandable,31 2 or presented to the general public with more realis-
tic assessments about their accuracy or usefulness.3 13 In the end, it is not
surprising that statisticians did not view privacy or confidentiality as
essential concerns of statistical practice. It was not until the discipline
had, itself, matured and settled into political and scientific life that ques-
tions of effects and unintended harms crept into the discussion. What-
ever the beginnings of confidentiality and privacy in statistics, these so-
cieties and their practitioners have now become strong advocates for
increasing confidentiality and privacy protections in statistical practice.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have explored the history and practice of confi-
dentiality in data collection in the United States. By no means compre-
hensive, this review has nevertheless shed light on a number of important
305. See Kate Holladay Claghom, The Limitations of Statistics, 11 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 97,
97-98 (1908) (book review).
306. See generally Kate Holladay Claghorn, Immigration in its Relation to Pauperism, 24
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 187 (1904) (discussing relevant conditions facing an entire
population of immigrants and also highlighting individuals in the population).
307. See Claghorn, supra note 175, at 165-66.
308. Claghorn, supra note 305, at 97.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 101.
311. See Pidgin, supra note 290, at 115.
312. See Walker, supra note 288, at 180-81.
313. Id. at 185-86.
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policy and practical considerations for the future of government statisti-
cal programs. As we have discussed, initial government programs that
relied on voluntary data disclosures were met with high levels of indi-
vidual suspicion. Initial legislative responses that focused on public dis-
closures or criminal penalties in order to increase compliance were
largely unsuccessful precisely because they failed to address the underly-
ing problem-mistrust of governmental purpose.
Recent events have stirred currents of mistrust. In particular, pas-
sage of the so-called USA PATRIOT Act ("The Patriot Act") and its
provisions for abrogating the confidentiality of federally-held statistical
data may erode trust in statistical agencies. In another paper, we have
examined the role that The Patriot Act has played in eroding citizens'
trust in government.315 Numerous commentators and pollsters have also
chronicled the rise of mistrust among the American citizenr. 3 6  The
314. The full name of the act is the "United and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter "Patriot Act"]. The impact of the Patriot Act on statistical confidential-
ity is an issue we take up in greater detail in Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
315. Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
316. A recent poll conducted by the Ponemon Institute, a private industry pollster, declared that
"the general public holds a relatively low or negative impression of various federal government
organizations that are presented in our survey." Thomas Claburn, Report: People Don't Trust Gov-
ernment To Protect Privacy, INFO. WEEK (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.informationweek.com/story/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 17700220 (quoting a survey of more than 6,300 Americans sponsored
by Carnegie Mellon University's CIO Institute). According to this survey, only 22% of Americans
felt favorably toward the Justice Department's treatment of individual privacy. Id. In addition, "Sub-
jects cited loss of civil liberties (64%), surveillance into personal life (63%), and monitoring of e-
mail and web activities (47%) as having the biggest impact on their privacy perceptions." Id.
According to one source, the level of individuals having "no trust" in government is
sharply on the increase even after 9/11. Press Release, Decision Analyst, Inc., Surprising Number of
Americans Say They Have No Trust In U.S. Government, Government Agencies, Survey Shows
(June 13, 2001), http://www.decisionanalyst.com/publ data/2001/Attitudes.asp (detailing that one in
seven Americans claim to have "no trust" in government). Other polls have shown that, despite some
rise in trust in matters of national security, high levels of distrust continue for issues of domestic
importance. See Gary Langer, Water's Edge Greater Trust in Government Limited to National
Security, Jan. 15, 2002, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/poll0I120115.html. In
addition, there is some poll evidence indicating rising distrust among younger Americans. Carl
Weiser, Survey: Young People Losing Trust in Government, Jan. 16, 2004, http://www.usatoday.
com/news/politicselections/nation/2004-01-16-youngvoters-gnsx.htm. See also John Samples,
Americans Don't Trust Big Government on Home Front, Says ABC Poll, Jan. 31, 2002,
http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-31-02.html; Garry Langer, Trust in Government . . . to do What?,
PUB. PERSP. July/Aug. 2002, at 7, passim; Robert J. Blendon et al., Changing Attitudes in America,
in WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT, 205, 206-07 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al, eds. 1997). But
see The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, Trust in Government Index 1948-
2002, http://www.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a 5.htm (using proprietary index score, the
NES survey ranked trust in government as 27 in 1980, 29 in 1990, 34 in 1998, 36 in 2000, and 43 in
2002). The data is not entirely clear. Many surveys continue to show spikes of trust in government
following 9/11. For example, the National Election Studies group that seeks to poll individuals about
general attitudes toward government, including trust, have concluded that overall trust in govern-
ment is rising. The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, Trust the Federal Gov-
ernment 1958-2002, http://www.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a-l.htm (indicating a large
recent increase in the percentage of people who trust the government "most of the time."). However,
it is not clear that these surveys account for differential areas of trust-where some may trust in
national security but not other areas. Other writers also indicate increased trust in government post-
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exact effect this rise in mistrust has or may have on government statisti-
cal programs is uncertain; however, the United States Census Bureau is
certainly aware of increased public concern about privacy and is trying to
preemptively reassure the public that information is kept completely con-
fidential and is never given to law enforcement agencies.1 7
In this article, we have related the evolution of the concept of pri-
vacy in law and the parallel concept of confidentiality in statistical prac-
tice. Current laws and codes of ethics reflect the times and mores during
which they were developed. Law has evolved to view privacy as a right;
all statistical codes of ethics now strongly assert that confidentiality of
respondents' information must be maintained.
We have seen, however, that confidentiality was not a prominent
feature of statistical codes of ethics until after the second wave of privacy
concern during the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, despite the nascent
computer technology, accessing confidential information or matching
records required a great deal of exertion: many records, for example,
could only be found by poring over files in a courthouse basement. The
ethical codes of statistical societies still reflect to some extent the as-
sumption that confidentiality will be breached primarily by deliberate
releases of information.
In light of recent events, this assumption is questionable. The data
company ChoicePoint, which performs data mining and manipulation on
19 billion data records for clients, was recently found to have sold data
on 145,000 people to a con artist.31 8 Mr. Oluwatosin paid for all of the
records and ordered them in small batches so as not to alert ChoicePoint
security systems.319 In March 2005, it was announced that criminals
used stolen passwords to obtain information on 32,000 persons in a data-
base owned by LexisNexis. 320 There are likely many other examples in
which unauthorized individuals have obtained confidential data but
where the perpetrators have not been caught. It is even possible, al-
though the Census Bureau maintains that it has a perfect record of main-
9/11. Virginia A. Chanley, Trust in Government in the Aftermath of 9/l 1: Determinants and Conse-
quences, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 469,471-73, 479 (2002).
317. The Census Bureau recently announced the appointment of its first Chief Privacy Officer,
and the launching of a new Data Stewardship Web Page. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Cen-
sus Bureau Names Gerald W. Gates as First Chief Privacy Officer (Mar. 1, 2005),
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/miscellaneous/004060.html. One of
the headings on the new web page is "Partnership and Trust": it is emphasized that "We honor
privacy, protect confidentiality, share our expertise globally, and conduct our work openly."
http://www.census.gov (follow "Data Protection & Privacy Policy " hyperlink; then follow "Partner-
ship and Trust" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
318. Greg Fulton et al., Are Your Secrets Safe? TIME, Mar. 7, 2005, at 46-47.
319. Id.
320. Ellen Simon, Data Broker Says Personal Records of 32,000 Vulnerable, EAST VALLEY
TRIB., Mar. 10, 2005, at B3, available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/technology/0503/12/tech-
113016.htm.
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taining confidentiality,32' that individuals have been identified by persons
who just have never been caught.
Much of the concern about privately collected data is also transfer-
able to data collected by the federal government. As Senator Patrick
Leahy stated regarding databanks collected by private entities:
The temptation will be more and more-especially in a polarized so-
ciety and a society where there is a fear, whether it's the Red Scare in
the fifties or terrorism in this century-to use those databanks.... At
some point it doesn't matter if they're private or public, at some point
they will be used by the government to determine who is a good
American and who is a bad American. Not determined through
prosecution, trial, but based on what came up on someone's computer
322screen.
In the end, we believe that a better understanding between lawyers
and statisticians about the tensions that arise between what is legal, what
is trust-enhancing, and what is statistically possible, provides an avenue
for both better legislative and statistical practice. We further posit that
legal regimes would be greatly improved if increased collaboration with
statisticians was included as an aspect of any new regulation about data
access and protection. Finally, we believe that federal statistical practice
should be subject to legal frameworks that more consciously approve of
statistical association codes of ethics for aiding in determinations con-
ceming appropriate data releases and anonymization techniques. At the
same time, we believe that there must be a legal shield protecting data
given under a pledge of confidentiality from being used to harm individ-
ual respondents.32 3
321. See Census Bureau Goes All Out, supra note 280 at 2. But see Bohme & Pemberton,
supra note 27, at 8. Bohme and Pemberton detail numerous possible breaches in confidentiality and
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detail how "the Census Bureau ... permitted the public unrestricted access to the census records
from 1790 through 1880" and only restricted access to the later censuses because of difficulties in
binding and displaying the volumes. Id. at 9. During World War I, the Census Bureau provided
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Id. (citing Letter of E.R. Magie, Acting Solicitor, to the Secretary of Commerce (Jan. 15, 1920)).
Such breaches of confidentiality, although apparently legal, were also employed to aid in deportation
proceedings. Id. at 9-10. Of interest is the fact that strict confidentiality was given to economic data
as it had traditionally been since 1810. Id. at 2.
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Technological advances and sociological changes ultimately compel
rethinking some of the ethical underpinnings of modem statistical prac-
tice. Medical ethics guidelines developed during the early-to-mid twen-
tieth century have had to be updated and modified to adapt to genome-
based research and other scientific innovations. We are at a similar point
with the statistical codes of ethics. It is important to see that they devel-
oped in response to the particular technological and popular concerns of
the 1970s. To stay relevant, the ethical codes now need to be updated to
deal with today's problems, and statistical societies need to continue
encouraging scientific work on confidentiality protection. In this en-
deavor, statisticians can benefit from a better understanding of the con-
cepts of privacy codified in law.
It was not widely noted at the time, but 1890 marked a turning point
in the conception of legal and statistical privacy. As we have demon-
strated, after 1890 legal and statistical disciplines implemented changes
that both responded to and spurred new notions of individual privacy and
human dignity. It is widely known that the advent of new technologies
and the increase of urbanization compelled much of the legal change we
note. Statisticians, however, were equally affected by new technologies
at the end of the nineteenth century. In particular, 1890 saw the intro-
duction of the Hollerith machines used to tabulate data in the United
States Census.324 Although primitive by today's standards, the Hollerith
machines inaugurated the computer age of information processing-
greatly increasing the efficiency and potential of government data analy-
sis. Of course, these same potentials carried with them the spectre of
increased dangers to privacy and confidentiality. As technology
changed, so statistical societies, as in law, sought to arrange their affairs
to deal with the new potentials and threats. We believe that the United
States is at a similar point in its history-where technology creates both
potentials and dangers for statistical practice and individual privacy. In
this new era of unprecedented access to information about individuals
and unprecedented need for reliable data about society, we must be wary
of clinging to tried and true methods without deeper analysis. We must
be prepared to consider new policies, practices, codes, and regulations to
seek the best solutions to the problems we face. Ultimately, we believe
this cannot be done by either discipline in isolation from the other.
324. See Joel Shurkin, ENGINES OF THE MIND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER FROM
MAINFRAMES TO MICROPROCESSORS 78 (1996).
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